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FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
ROGER J. PERLSTADT* 
Arbitrators determine facts and apply law to those facts to bindingly resolve 
disputes between two or more parties, a task normally reserved for judges.  The 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes agreements to arbitrate disputes 
enforceable, including disputes that would normally be heard by an Article III 
judge, such as those arising under federal law or between parties of diverse 
citizenship.  Accordingly, disputes subject to an arbitration agreement brought 
before a federal court for adjudication must instead, pursuant to the FAA, be 
resolved by an arbitrator.  Yet, while Article III ostensibly mandates that life-
tenured and salary-protected judges decide such disputes, arbitrators—selected 
and compensated by one or more of the parties—enjoy neither protection.  A 
literal reading of Article III thus suggests that sending federal disputes to non-
Article III arbitrators under the FAA is unconstitutional.  Although courts 
and scholars have roundly rejected Article III literalism and have adopted 
various theories justifying non-Article III adjudication of Article III disputes, 
whether the FAA is consistent with Article III has received little analysis.  This 
Article addresses that gap by applying the leading judicial and scholarly 
theories of non-Article III adjudication to the FAA, ultimately determining that 
none of them justify arbitration.  While a legislative change could remedy the 
tension between Article III and the FAA, this Article suggests that the better 
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approach is simply to acknowledge the fundamental inconsistency of the FAA 
with Article III while recognizing that parties may waive their constitutional 
right to an Article III forum.  Given that arbitration is a waiver of Article III 
rights, however, this Article concludes that consent to arbitration must be 
determined under the standards used to determine waiver of constitutional 
rights generally, a fundamental shift from current FAA jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a typical employment discrimination case in which an 
employee files suit in federal court alleging that she has been 
discriminated against on the basis of her race or gender in violation 
of federal anti-discrimination statutes.  The employer responds by 
pointing to an arbitration clause in an employment agreement or 
employee handbook stating that any disputes between the employee 
and employer will be resolved by binding arbitration.  Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act1 (FAA), the court must dismiss or stay the 
litigation, and order the parties to arbitrate the claim pursuant to the 
arbitration agreement.2  While the widespread use of predispute 
                                                          
 1. Ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)). 
 2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006). 
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arbitration agreements3 and the Supreme Court’s consistent 
endorsement of them4 may render this scenario common, something 
quite remarkable is occurring:  a dispute arising under federal law 
and brought by one of the parties to an Article III court for 
adjudication has been sent elsewhere—as required by an act of 
Congress—for resolution by one or more arbitrators who are not 
federal judges subject to Article III’s salary and tenure protections.  
Indeed, the arbitrator may be selected and compensated by the 
employer, one of the parties to the dispute.5  This raises the question 
of whether the FAA is consistent with Article III’s ostensible 
assignment of the task of resolving the dispute to the federal 
judiciary. 
Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United 
States in the Supreme Court and whatever lower federal courts 
Congress decides to establish.6  Although not defined in the 
Constitution, judicial power can generally be understood as 
encompassing the power to bindingly resolve a controversy between 
two or more disputants by determining facts and applying the law to 
those facts.7  Article III extends this power to certain specified cases 
and controversies, including, among others, cases arising under 
federal law and controversies between citizens of different states.8  
Importantly, Article III mandates that this power be exercised by 
judges enjoying life tenure and salary protection.9  A literal reading of 
Article III thus suggests that any entities authorized by Congress to 
                                                          
 3. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1639–40 (2005). 
 4. See generally infra Part I.A–B. 
 5. See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) (describing an arbitration program in which an employer unilaterally 
established pool from which arbitrator must be selected); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. 
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that it is common practice for 
employers in the securities industry to pay the arbitrators’ fees); RICHARD A. BALES, 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:  THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 109 (1997) 
(describing an employee dispute resolution program in which the employer paid all 
costs of arbitration exceeding a $50 filing fee). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, 
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.”). 
 7. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 9. Id. § 1.  Note that the Constitution does, however, contemplate state 
courts—whose judges may lack life tenure and salary protections—exercising 
judicial power over Article III disputes.  For a discussion of state court adjudication 
of federal disputes, see infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:35 PM 
204 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:201 
 
exercise the judicial power, i.e., to resolve disputes of the type 
specified in Article III, must be Article III courts whose 
determinations are made by judges with life tenure and salary 
protection.10 
“Article III literalism,” as it has been dubbed,11 however, is simply 
untenable in today’s legal landscape.12  For example, administrative 
agencies, bankruptcy courts, courts-martial, and federal magistrate 
judges, all exercise judicial power over Article III disputes without 
tenure and salary protections.  Both courts and commentators have 
explored the contours of Article III and discussed when and how 
non-Article III tribunals may resolve Article III disputes.13  Yet one 
important type of adjudication of Article III disputes by non-Article 
III bodies has received little analysis:  private arbitration under the 
FAA.  Arbitrators exercise judicial power, determining facts and 
applying law to those facts to bindingly resolve disputes between 
private parties.14  Such disputes often arise under federal law or 
between parties of diverse citizenship—precisely the kinds of 
disputes expressly covered by Article III.  Yet arbitrators enjoy neither 
the tenure nor the salary protections of Article III judges.  Instead, 
the parties to the dispute being arbitrated select and compensate the 
arbitrator. 
Determining whether the FAA is consistent with Article III is 
important for at least two reasons.  First, and most obviously, 
legislative fidelity to the Constitution is important simply as part of 
the tradition of American constitutionalism, the essence of which is 
“the distinction between ordinary and fundamental law.”15  To the 
                                                          
 10. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 918–19 (1988) (describing “article III literalism” as 
the view that Article III’s language creates a system in which “the only federal 
tribunals that can be assigned to resolve justiciable controversies are ‘article III 
courts’”). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 919–26; see also Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 625 (2007) (“[T]he letter of Article III is both wildly 
impractical . . . and at war with history . . . .”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, 
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 656 
(2004) (“[W]hile scholars continue to hold up a literal interpretation of Article III as 
a goal to which the law might aspire, this approach suffers from serious problems of 
institutional fit.”); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the 
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 228 (“Perhaps it is simply too late in 
the day to suggest an absolute construction of article III; a distinguished—if largely 
confused and unprincipled—line of cases has taken us well beyond that stage.”). 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. Christian G. Fritz, Fallacies of American Constitutionalism, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1327, 
1332 (2004); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) 
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extent “ordinary” legislation (such as the FAA) is inconsistent with 
the “fundamental” law of the Constitution, the legislation must 
yield.16  As Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers, “[t]here 
is no position which depends on clearer principles.”17  Identifying 
irreconcilable conflicts between legislation and the Constitution in 
order to remedy the offending legislation, or, alternatively, 
explaining why apparent conflicts are not irreconcilable, helps 
maintain the proper functioning of American constitutionalism. 
The other reason why it is important to determine whether 
resolution of Article III disputes by non-Article III arbitrators is 
consistent with the Constitution is the significant, and potentially 
determinative, differences between Article III courts and arbitration.  
Article III judges, who enjoy life tenure and salary protections, have 
radically different incentives than non-Article III arbitrators retained 
and paid for by the parties to a dispute.  For example, because 
arbitrators are chosen by and compensated by the parties, they are 
competing with each other for dispute resolution business.  Indeed, 
one arbitration provider, JAMS, openly acknowledges this 
competition, encouraging disputants to choose it over other 
providers the disputants may have already selected.18  Consequently, 
the incentive exists for arbitrators to favor parties they expect to 
require arbitration services again in the future.19  This kind of 
                                                          
(contrasting the Constitution as “superior, paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means” with “ordinary legislative acts”). 
 16. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“This theory [that an act of the 
legislature repugnant to the constitution is void] is . . . one of the fundamental 
principles of our society.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“No legislative act . . . contrary to the constitution can 
be valid . . . .  If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the 
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be 
preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, 
the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”). 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 16, at 524. 
 18. See JAMS Arbitration Practice, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/adr-arbitration 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“If another arbitration provider was written into your 
contract, call an experienced JAMS Case Manager to discuss having your case 
administered by JAMS.”). 
 19. See BALES, supra note 5, at 128 (noting that the knowledge that an employer 
is more likely than an employee to hire an arbitrator in the future may consciously 
or subconsciously induce the arbitrator to favor the employer); Roger J. Perlstadt, 
Comment, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1983, 1986–87 (2002) (describing incentive of arbitrators in disputes between 
Internet domain name registrants and trademark holders to find in favor of 
trademark holders to attract their business in the future); Letter from Lori 
Swanson, Att’y Gen. of Minn., to President, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (July 19, 2009), 
available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf (describing the 
findings of a year-long investigation of consumer arbitration providers including 
that “an arbitrator is more likely to favor the party that is likely to send [it] future 
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incentive, which understandably raises a concern of arbitrator bias in 
favor of repeat players, is completely absent from Article III judges.20  
Further, despite this higher risk of bias, arbitrators are actually held 
to a lower standard of impartiality than Article III judges.21  
Establishing that these differences between arbitrators and Article III 
judges are actually outcome-determinative is a difficult empirical 
question beyond the scope of this Article.22  Nevertheless, the 
structural incentives of arbitrators, coupled with the lower 
impartiality standard, are an important distinction between 
                                                          
cases”).  But see Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 126 (2004) (noting that “market competition . . . 
may improve the quality of [arbitrators’] decisionmaking by inducing greater care”). 
 20. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers and 
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 78 n.335 (1997) (“[A federal] judge, who is 
appointed for life, may well be less subject to bias than an arbitrator, who relies on 
parties and their lawyers for repeat business.”); Letter from Lori Swanson, supra note 
19 (“This bias does not exist in a court, where the judge is not reliant on a dominant 
player for his or her future income.”).  Alexander Hamilton defended the salary 
protections in Article III by suggesting that such protections help to eliminate bias 
because “in the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence 
amounts to a power over his will.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 16, at 531 
(Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted). 
 21. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“Arbitration differs from adjudication, among many other ways, 
because the ‘appearance of partiality’ ground of disqualification for judges does not 
apply to arbitrators . . . .”); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 
991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Arbitrators are not held to the ethical standards 
required of Article III judges . . . .”); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173–
74 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The mere appearance of bias that might disqualify a judge will 
not disqualify an arbitrator.”). 
 22. Empirical evidence comparing arbitration results to litigation results is 
sparse and inconclusive.  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 151–54 (Edward Brunet 
et al. eds., 2006) (describing the difficulties in studying the differences between 
arbitration and litigation); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, How Bad Are Mandatory 
Arbitration Terms?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 777, 778–79 (2008).  Introducing a 
symposium aimed at “strengthening the empirical basis of the debate over 
arbitration clauses,” Professor Ben-Shahar pointed to two conflicting empirical 
claims made by the California Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit regarding 
whether employees do better in arbitration or litigation against employers.  The 
California Supreme Court has noted that “[v]arious studies show that arbitration is 
advantageous to employers . . . because it reduces the size of the award that an 
employee is likely to get, particularly if the employer is a ‘repeat player’ in the 
arbitration system.”  Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 
669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:  The Repeat 
Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing 
Small Print To Protect Big Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of 
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60–61).  Contrast the above with the 
Seventh Circuit’s statement that “[e]mployees fare well in arbitration with their 
employers—better by some standards than employees who litigate”  Oblix, Inc. v. 
Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Theodore Eisenberg & 
Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims:  An Empirical 
Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44). 
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arbitrators and Article III judges.  This distinction suggests at least a 
potential for decision-maker bias that is greater when a dispute is 
resolved through arbitration rather than before an Article III judge.  
Consequently, determining whether non-Article III arbitrators may 
resolve Article III disputes has practical significance in addition to the 
theoretical importance in preserving American constitutionalism. 
Despite the importance of determining whether private arbitration 
under the FAA is consistent with Article III, the issue has received 
little attention from either courts or commentators.  The Supreme 
Court, notwithstanding a steady docket of FAA cases, has never fully 
analyzed this Article III issue.  The only opinion in which the Court 
offered even a cursory analysis of the issue is an admiralty case from 
1932, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus.23  In that case, the Supreme 
Court upheld enforcement of an arbitration agreement against an 
Article III challenge.24  The Court noted that while Article III declares 
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it does not direct the court to 
adopt any particular procedure.25  Thus, held the Court, Congress 
could, in such cases, “give either party right of trial by jury, or modify 
the practice of the court in any other respect that it deems more 
conducive to the administration of justice.”26  What the Court failed 
to explain, however, is how having the dispute bindingly resolved by 
arbitrators was simply “modify[ing] the practice of the court in 
[some] respect,”27 as opposed to a wholesale delegation of judicial 
power to non-Article III actors.  Marine Transit’s limited analysis was 
contemporaneously described as a “summary disposal of the question 
of constitutionality.”28  Further, the decision has not been 
subsequently cited by any of the lower federal courts addressing the 
issue of whether the FAA is consistent with Article III.  To the 
contrary, those lower courts addressing the issue have—also with 
little analysis—uniformly adopted what could be called waiver theory, 
holding that enforcement of arbitration agreements under the Act 
                                                          
 23. 284 U.S. 263 (1932); see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:  A 
Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
949, 978 n.123 (2000) (“Remarkably perhaps, admiralty is the only context in which 
the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the FAA.”). 
 24. Marine Transit, 284 U.S. at 279. 
 25. Id. at 278. 
 26. Id. at 278–79 (quoting Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 
(12 How.) 443, 460 (1851)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Recent Case, Arbitration—Constitutionality of the United States Arbitration Act, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 925, 926 (1932). 
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presents no Article III problem because the right to have a dispute 
resolved in an Article III forum may be waived by the disputants.29 
Like the courts, scholars too have largely failed to address the 
FAA’s potential Article III problem.30  While there has been some 
scholarly debate over how to reconcile arbitration with the Seventh 
Amendment’s right to a jury,31 the Seventh Amendment question is 
rendered moot by the potential Article III problem.  The Seventh 
Amendment does not apply to adjudications before non-Article III 
tribunals,32 and thus, determining whether the FAA is consistent with 
Article III makes the Seventh Amendment inquiry unnecessary.  If 
private arbitration under the FAA violates Article III, it is irrelevant 
whether it also violates the Seventh Amendment; conversely, if private 
arbitration under the FAA may proceed despite its non-Article III 
status, the Seventh Amendment is simply not implicated.  In addition, 
                                                          
 29. See, e.g., Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The 
right to an Article III forum is not absolute and may be waived.  Where an individual 
consents to arbitration, he waives the right to an impartial and independent 
adjudication.” (citation omitted)); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 
1994) (“[A] person may, by contract, waive his or her right to [Article III] 
adjudication . . . .” (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2)); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 
719, 730 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“If defendants had wanted this dispute resolved by an 
Article III judge and a jury, they could have refused to enter into an arbitration 
clause in the Agreement.”).  One lower federal court simply called an Article III 
challenge to the Federal Arbitration Act “frivolous.”  Sutter Corp. v. P & P Indus., 
No. 3:96-CV-1005-H, 1996 WL 622465, at *2 n.6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1996), rev’d on 
other grounds, 125 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1997).  That court offered no additional analysis 
of the Article III challenge, citing only Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), for support, despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court there did not address Article III concerns. 
 30. But see Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189, 
1194–204 (2008) (rejecting waiver theory and proposing a “modified appellate 
review theory”); Sternlight, supra note 20, at 78–80 (raising concerns about 
arbitration’s potential Article III problem); see also Vicki Zick, Comment, Reshaping 
the Constitution To Meet the Practical Needs of the Day:  The Judicial Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 261–70 (1998) (arguing that the Federal 
Arbitration Act represents an erosion of Article III, and rejecting waiver theory). 
 31. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 382 
(2d ed. 2010) (citing debate over the course of several articles between Jean 
Sternlight and Stephen Ware over waivers of Seventh Amendment jury rights in 
arbitration). 
 32. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989) (“[I]f [an] 
action must be tried under the auspices of an Article III court, then the Seventh 
Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury trial whenever the cause of action is 
legal in nature.  Conversely, if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory 
cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the Seventh Amendment poses no 
independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.”); see also 
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
460–61 (1977) (holding that the Seventh Amendment did not prohibit Congress 
from assigning adjudicative powers to administrative fora); Colleen P. Murphy, 
Note, Article III Implications for the Applicability of the Seventh Amendment to Federal 
Statutory Actions, 95 YALE L.J. 1459, 1459–60 (1986) (“[I]n a non-Article III federal 
forum . . . the Seventh Amendment simply does not apply.”). 
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given that the vast majority of federal cases are resolved by dispositive 
motion prior to ever reaching a jury,33 the practical significance of 
protecting a Seventh Amendment right to a jury seems dwarfed by 
the importance of protecting access to an Article III tribunal. 
In a notable exception to the general scholarly silence on the 
FAA’s potential Article III problem, Peter Rutledge has explicitly 
rejected the waiver theory adopted by courts, offering as an 
alternative what he calls “modified appellate review theory.”34  
Applying his modified appellate review theory to private voluntary 
arbitration under the FAA, Professor Rutledge concludes that, 
“[w]hile the issue is close,” such arbitration survives Article III 
challenge.35 
This Article respectfully disagrees with Professor Rutledge’s 
conclusion that the FAA is consistent with Article III under an 
appellate review theory, and concludes that waiver theory offers the 
only feasible way to justify arbitration in light of Article III.  In doing 
so, this Article fills a major analytic gap of waiver theory.  The main 
shortcoming of waiver theory as currently articulated is that it 
proposes a solution (waiver) without ever grappling with whether a 
problem (the inconsistency of the FAA with Article III) really exists.  
This Article addresses that gap by asking whether the FAA actually 
has an Article III problem that needs to be waived.  It does so by 
applying the leading judicial and scholarly theories of non-Article III 
adjudication to the FAA.  In ultimately endorsing waiver theory, this 
Article also responds to the argument that Article III protects not 
only personal rights to an Article III forum, but also structural 
separation of powers concerns that are not waivable by disputants,36 
filling another gap in current waiver theory.37 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:  JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 149 tbl.C-
4 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 
2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf (reporting 245,288 civil case terminations by court 
action prior to trial and only 2254 jury trials for the twelve months ending September 
30, 2011). 
 34. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1194–2004. 
 35. Id. at 1226. 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 1200. 
 37. The federal courts espousing waiver theory do not address the structural 
separation of powers argument, and Professor Sternlight addresses it by simply 
noting that parties may not waive their right to an Article III forum “where such 
waiver would threaten the institutional integrity of the judicial branch.”  Sternlight, 
supra note 20, at 79.  Professor Sternlight seems to suggest, however, that most, if not 
all, arbitration threatens the judicial branch, id. at 79–80, in which case her 
limitation on waiver would potentially eviscerate waiver theory.  This Article argues 
that private arbitration under the FAA does not implicate structural separation of 
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This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides a brief overview of 
those aspects of the FAA relevant to examining its potential 
inconsistency with Article III.  Part II sets out the judicial and 
scholarly theories of adjudication by non-Article III tribunals and 
demonstrates that none of those theories renders the FAA consistent 
with Article III.  Part III addresses potential solutions, ultimately 
concluding that the best approach is simply to acknowledge the 
fundamental inconsistency of the FAA with Article III, but to 
recognize, as waiver theory suggests, that disputants may waive their 
right to an Article III forum.  Finally, this Article concludes that, 
given that arbitration is a waiver of Article III rights, consent to 
arbitration must be determined under the standards used to 
determine waiver of constitutional rights generally, a fundamental 
departure from current FAA jurisprudence. 
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
Prior to the 1920s, disputes brought in court were not typically sent 
to arbitration, regardless of any arbitration agreement between the 
parties.  Courts generally would not specifically enforce arbitration 
agreements, refusing to stay litigation and compel arbitration of 
disputes covered by such agreements.38  At best, courts would award 
nominal damages against a party refusing to arbitrate for breach of 
the agreement to arbitrate.39  Two rationales were invoked for this 
judicial refusal to enforce arbitration agreements.40  First, it was 
argued that private parties could not “oust” courts of their 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes.41  Second, it was argued that 
                                                          
powers concerns, but only waivable individual rights to an Article III forum.  See infra 
Part III.B.1. 
 38. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“The 
federal courts—like those of the States and of England—have, both in equity and at 
law, denied, in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to enforce 
executory agreements to arbitrate disputes.  They have declined to compel specific 
performance or to stay proceedings on the original cause of action.” (footnote 
omitted) (citation omitted)); STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 22 (discussing the 
early history of judicial treatment of arbitration agreements and the “revocability 
doctrine”); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:  REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 20 (1992) (noting several weaknesses in 
the early arbitration system such as lack of enforceability and the lack of specific 
performance as a remedy for breach). 
 39. STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 22. 
 40. Id. at 22–23. 
 41. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“[Numerous 
cases] show that agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction 
conferred by law are illegal and void.”); see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg 
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942) (“[I]t became fashionable in the 
middle of the 18th century to say that [arbitration] agreements were against public 
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arbitration was simply ineffective at administering justice.42  In the 
early part of the twentieth century, however, a reform movement 
began gaining steam in an effort to reverse the non-enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.43  A primary reason why reformers wanted 
arbitration agreements to be made enforceable was their belief that 
arbitration was less costly and more efficient than litigation.44 
In 1920, New York adopted an arbitration act making arbitration 
agreements specifically enforceable.45  Following their success in New 
York, the reformers wanted to create a uniform arbitration act that 
would be adopted by every other state, and to have Congress pass a 
federal arbitration act.46  The reason the reformers wanted a federal 
act was because in the pre-Erie world in which they operated, even if 
every state had an arbitration statute making arbitration agreements 
valid, federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction would not have to 
enforce such agreements.47  As explained by the late Ian R. MacNeil: 
[T]he most important fact in the legal background [against which 
the FAA was presented to Congress] was the universal 
understanding in the period from 1922 to 1925 that the 
enforcement and nonenforcement of arbitration agreements and 
                                                          
policy because they ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the courts.”).  Kulukundis has been 
described as “ the official history of arbitration in America.”  STEPHEN K. HUBER 
& MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (3d ed. 2011). 
 42. See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) 
(No. 14,065) (“[Arbitrators] are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the 
principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated cases . . . .  
Ought then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tribunal, by which, however 
honest and intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal or equitable rights 
of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?”); see also Kulukundis, 
126 F.2d at 983 (“An effort has been made to justify this judicial hostility to the 
executory arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitrations, if unsupervised by 
the courts, are undesirable . . . .”). 
 43. See MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 25–47 (describing reform efforts from 1911 to 
1925). 
 44. Id. at 29–30. 
 45. See STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 29. 
 46. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:  How the Supreme Court Created 
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101–02 
(2006) (describing the efforts of Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer to promote 
the use of arbitration). 
 47. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 
VA. L. REV. 265, 275–76 (1926) (“Every one of the States in the Union might declare 
[arbitration] agreement[s] to be valid and enforceable, and still in the Federal courts 
[they] would remain void and unenforceable without this statute [the Federal 
Arbitration Act].”); see also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:  Joint Hearings on 
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 
(1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings on Arbitration] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) 
(“Why do you have to have [an arbitration act] in the Federal law? . . . [T]he Federal 
court will not be bound by any State statute.”); MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 132 (“The 
practical concern advanced by Cohen and Dayton was a product of the rule of Swift 
v. Tyson . . . as yet unmodified by [Erie].”). 
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awards, particularly specific enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, were matters of remedy.  In that day, before Erie had 
complicated such matters, remedial issues of this kind were 
indisputably within the exclusive province of the court in which 
enforcement was sought, the forum court.  Moreover, the federal 
courts plainly were hellbent on sticking to the proposition that 
state arbitration statutes were not substantive law, and hence not 
binding on the federal courts.  This was their position, whether in 
admiralty or in diversity cases, and whether or not interstate 
commerce was involved.48 
Against this backdrop, the FAA was passed in 1925.49  Under the 
FAA, arbitration agreements are deemed as enforceable as any other 
contract.50  If a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement is 
brought to court, the court must stay the litigation51 and compel the 
parties to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement.52  Thus, following 
enactment of the FAA, disputes brought to federal court could be 
sent to non-Article III arbitration for adjudication.  Interestingly, the 
question whether such an act was consistent with Article III’s 
allocation to federal courts of the power to bindingly adjudicate 
disputes within Article III’s jurisdictional grant does not appear to 
have been a concern of the FAA’s drafters.53 
Three important aspects of the FAA and its jurisprudence are 
particularly relevant to determining whether private arbitration of 
federal disputes is consistent with Article III.  First, the Supreme 
Court has broadly interpreted the FAA to cover a wide range of 
potential disputes.  Second, under current FAA jurisprudence, 
whether parties have consented to arbitrate a dispute is determined 
                                                          
 48. MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 109–10 (footnote omitted). 
 49. See generally id. at 84–101 (describing the enactment of FAA, then known as 
the United States Arbitration Act). 
 50. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 51. Id. § 3. 
 52. Id. § 4. 
 53. If it were a concern of the drafters, it appears to have been well-hidden 
because the issue does not seem to arise in the legislative history.  See generally 
MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 84–121 (describing enactment of the FAA and providing 
a detailed analysis of the legislative history).  In testimony before the House and 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittees, Julius Cohen, one of the primary drafters of the 
FAA, noted that the drafters had considered “one” constitutional provision, namely 
the Seventh Amendment.  See Joint Hearings on Arbitration, supra note 47, at 17 
(statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (“Now, there is one constitutional provision 
which we considered . . . .  The one constitutional provision we have got is that you 
have a right of trial by jury.”).  This statement suggests by implication that the 
drafters did not consider the potential Article III problem, which, as discussed above, 
is preliminary to the Seventh Amendment question.  See supra notes 31–33 and 
accompanying text. 
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by ordinary contract principles, which disregard the subjective intent 
of the parties.  Third, judicial review of arbitration awards is 
extremely limited. 
A. Scope of the Act 
The FAA makes enforceable any “written provision in . . . a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction.” 54  Thus, the FAA applies to disputes that (1) arise out of 
transactions involving commerce, and (2) are covered by written 
arbitration provisions.  The Supreme Court has interpreted both 
elements broadly, and the FAA thus covers a large number of 
disputes otherwise falling within the coverage of Article III. 
1. Transactions covered 
With respect to the first element—whether the dispute arises out 
of a transaction involving commerce—the Supreme Court has read 
the FAA to extend to the limits of Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce.55  For example, the Court in Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson56 held that the FAA applied to a dispute over 
allegedly ineffective residential pest control services because the 
exterminator was a multi-state firm and used out-of-state materials in 
performing the services.57 
While broadly reading the FAA to extend to the limits of 
Congress’s commerce power, however, the Supreme Court has 
narrowly read an express exception in the FAA that states that the act 
shall not apply to “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”58  Six years after Allied-Bruce Terminix, the 
Court held, relying on ejusdem generis,59 that the exception for 
                                                          
 54. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 55. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) 
(reading section two as “extending the Act’s reach to the limits of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1987) 
(describing the Act as “a statute that embodies Congress’ intent to provide for the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce 
Clause”). 
 56. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 57. Id. at 282. 
 58. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 59. Ejusdem generis is a cannon of statutory construction whereby a general phrase 
following a list of specific persons or things will be interpreted to include only 
persons or things of the same type as those listed.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 
(9th ed. 2009). 
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“workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” included only 
transportation workers, like seamen and railroad workers.60  Thus, 
while a contract for residential pest-control services is considered a 
transaction involving commerce such that a dispute arising out of 
those services is covered by the FAA, an exterminator performing 
those services is not deemed a worker engaged in interstate 
commerce such that his employment contract is excluded from the 
FAA’s coverage.  Consequently, under the Court’s jurisprudence, the 
FAA can apply to disputes arising out of all transactions within the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power, including employment 
agreements of all but a narrow class of transportation workers. 
2. Disputes covered 
The second element establishing the scope of the FAA—whether 
the dispute is covered by a written arbitration provision—also sweeps 
broadly.  Written arbitration provisions often cover “all disputes that 
arise out of or in relation” to the contract or transaction at issue,61 
and are construed liberally.62  Courts have put few, if any, limitations 
on the kinds of disputes covered by these broad boilerplate 
agreements.63  Historically, one category of disputes not arbitrable, 
even under a broad arbitration clause, was federal statutory claims.  
In 1953, for example, the Court held in Wilko v. Swan64 that claims 
under the Securities Act of 1933 were not arbitrable, despite a 
broadly worded agreement of the parties subjecting to arbitration 
“[a]ny controversy arising between [them].”65  Following Wilko, 
                                                          
 60. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–19 (2001). 
 61. STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 96; see, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967) (involving an arbitration clause stating 
that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the 
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration”). 
 62. See, e.g, Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“[D]ue regard must be given to the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in 
favor of arbitration.”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal 
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor 
of arbitration . . . .”). 
 63. See Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing cases that “liberally” and “expansively” construe agreements to arbitrate 
“[a]ll disputes arising in connection with this Agreement,” “any and all disputes 
arising under the arrangements contemplated hereunder,” “[a]ll disputes arising in 
connection with the present contract,” and “any dispute arising in connection with 
the implementation, interpretation or enforcement” of an agreement (alterations in 
original)). 
 64. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 65. Id. at 432 n.15, 433–35. 
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courts found claims under other federal statutes, such as the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, ERISA, Title VII, and the ADEA, not arbitrable 
as well.66  Yet in the 1980s, the Supreme Court began backing away 
from Wilko and started holding federal statutory claims arbitrable.67  
Ultimately, the Court expressly overturned Wilko,68 and, as it stated 
shortly thereafter, “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be 
the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the 
FAA.”69 
Between the Court’s broad reading of the FAA as covering all 
transactions within the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
(except employment contracts of a limited class of transportation 
workers), and its failure to place any limits on the kinds of disputes 
arising out of such transactions that can be arbitrated (including 
federal statutory claims), a large number of disputes ostensibly falling 
within the coverage of Article III can be made subject to arbitration 
agreements enforceable by the FAA. 
B. Consent to Arbitration 
Given that a large number of Article III disputes can be made the 
subject of an enforceable arbitration agreement, the question arises 
whether any particular dispute, in fact, is.  Arbitration under the FAA 
is ostensibly a creature of consent.70  By the express terms of the Act, a 
federal court may refuse to hear a dispute brought before it and, 
instead, send it to arbitration only if the dispute is subject to an 
“agreement” to arbitrate.71  Under current FAA jurisprudence, 
                                                          
 66. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451–53 
(2011) (collecting cases). 
 67. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 
(1987) (holding claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO 
arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S 614, 
638–40 (1985) (holding Sherman Act claims arbitrable); see also McMahon, 482 U.S. 
at 233 (“[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since 
that time.”). 
 68. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (“We now conclude that Wilko was 
incorrectly decided . . . .”). 
 69. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 70. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of 
consent, not coercion . . . .”); id. at 478 (“[T]he FAA does not require parties to 
arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so . . . .”). 
 71. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) (stating that courts must stay litigation of “any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration . . . upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to 
arbitration under such an agreement”); id. § 4 (“[U]pon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court shall make an 
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whether such an agreement exists is determined by ordinary contract 
principles.72  Ordinary contract principles hold, however, that the 
existence of an agreement is determined not by the subjective actual 
intent of the parties, but by their objective overt actions, such as 
signing a written document.73  Thus, a party signing a contract 
containing an arbitration provision will generally be bound by that 
provision, even if the party was unaware of the provision and had no 
actual intent to consent to arbitration.74  Similarly, an individual may 
be bound by an arbitration provision unilaterally adopted by an 
employer or service provider if that individual continues to work or 
use the service, regardless of any subjective knowledge of or 
                                                          
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009) (“[The 
Federal Arbitration Act does not] alter background principles of state contract law 
regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by 
them).”); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When 
deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts 
generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation 
of contracts.”). 
 73. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208–10 
(3d ed. 2004) (explaining objective theory of assent and noting that “courts 
universally accept it today”); id. § 4.26, at 558 (“A party that signs an agreement is 
regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain about not having 
read or understood it . . . .”); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary 
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 113–14 (1996) (“The requirement to form a contract 
is not that parties actually assent to its terms.  The requirement is that they take 
actions—such as signing their names on a document or saying certain words—that 
would lead a reasonable person to believe that they have assented to the terms of the 
contract.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that a non-English speaking employee was bound by an English-
language arbitration agreement he signed); Wash. Mut. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Bailey, 364 
F.3d 260, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2004) (enforcing an arbitration agreement despite an 
illiterate party’s inability to understand the agreement he signed).  While the Ninth 
Circuit has adopted a heightened standard that would require subjective intent to 
consent to arbitrate, Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“[W]e conclude that a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to . . . arbitrate 
her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration.”), it 
applies only to a narrow class of statutory claims, Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 113 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Lai knowing waiver requirement 
applies only to a comparatively small class of claims arising under Title VII or similar 
laws . . . .”), and other circuit courts have not followed suit.  See Morales, 541 F.3d at 
224; Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005); Am. 
Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002); Gibson v. 
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. 
Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997).  Confusingly, while the 
Sixth Circuit has stated that it has adopted a “knowing and voluntary” standard, it 
appears not to require subjective intent.  See Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 
507 F.3d 967, 971, 974 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding a “knowing and voluntary” waiver 
where an employee simply attended an informational meeting and received a copy of 
the employer’s dispute resolution policy). 
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agreement to be bound by the provision.75 
Another example of how disputants may be bound to an 
arbitration clause to which they did not subjectively assent is the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements against non-parties.  In Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle,76 the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause 
traditional principles of state law allow a contract to be enforced by 
or against nonparties to the contract through assumption, piercing 
the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party 
beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel,” there is no per se reason 
why non-parties could not enforce an arbitration agreement.77  While 
Arthur Andersen involved enforcement of an arbitration agreement by 
a non-party to the agreement, lower courts have read that case as 
authority supporting the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
against non-parties.78  In addition, even before Arthur Andersen, some 
courts had held that arbitration agreements could bind non-parties.79  
Thus, various courts have ruled that a husband asserting a wrongful 
death suit was bound by an arbitration agreement between his 
deceased wife and her insurer,80 a patient asserting a personal injury 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 972–74 (holding that by continuing to work, an 
employee assented to her employer’s unilateral adoption of an arbitration program); 
Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030–31 (S.D. Miss. 
2000) (holding that by failing to close their account, depositors assented to an 
arbitration clause unilaterally adopted by a bank in a revised deposit agreement; that 
depositors did not read revised agreement was deemed irrelevant).  Finding assent in 
such cases is not without its critics.  See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 980 (Martin, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing a holding that an employee was bound to a unilaterally 
adopted arbitration clause, noting that “[t]his is not how contracts are formed”); 
Horton, supra note 66, at 456–59 (criticizing courts’ receptiveness to companies’ use 
of nondescript bill stuffers to unilaterally add arbitration provisions to millions of 
consumer contracts as “hard to square with the strong presumption against inferring 
acceptance by silence”). 
 76. 556 U.S. 624 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 631 (quoting 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 57:19, at 183 (4th ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 78. See, e.g., Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329, 
333–34 (5th Cir. 2010) (reading Arthur Andersen as “concluding . . . that 
nonsignatories to arbitration agreements . . . may sometimes be compelled to 
arbitrate”); THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, Civ No. 11-537 LH/CG, 2012 
WL 112216, at *6–10 (D.N.M. Jan. 3, 2012) (citing Arthur Anderson in holding a 
nonsignatory bound by an arbitration agreement), aff’d sub nom. Fundamental 
Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, Nos. 12-2014, 12-2065, 2012 WL 5992259 (10th Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2012). 
 79. See, e.g., Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[N]onsignatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under ordinary 
contract and agency principles.”); Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty.) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 
444 (3d Cir. 1999) (“When asked to enforce an arbitration agreement against a 
nonsignatory, we ask whether he or she is bound by that agreement under traditional 
principles of contract and agency law.”). 
 80. Drissi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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claim against a nursing home was bound by an arbitration agreement 
between her mother and the home,81 and an employee injured at a 
corporate leadership workshop was bound by an arbitration 
agreement between his employer and the workshop provider.82  In 
those cases, disputants seeking to bring claims in court were bound 
by arbitration agreements to which they were not even parties, let 
alone to which they had subjectively assented. 
An additional aspect of federal arbitration law—the so-called 
separability doctrine—further undermines any notion that a party 
must subjectively consent to arbitration.  The separability doctrine 
was first endorsed by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Manufacturing Co.83  In that case, Prima Paint and F & C 
had entered into a “Consulting Agreement” shortly after Prima 
Paint’s purchase of F & C’s paint business.84  Under the Consulting 
Agreement, Prima Paint would take over the servicing of former F & 
C customers and pay F & C a percentage of receipts from those 
customers in exchange for various consulting services from F & C and 
a covenant not to compete.85  Prima Paint subsequently filed suit in 
federal court, alleging that it had been fraudulently induced to enter 
into the Consulting Agreement by F & C’s representations that it was 
solvent and able to perform its contractual obligations, when in fact, 
F & C was headed towards bankruptcy.86  F & C moved to stay the 
litigation pending arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the 
allegedly fraudulently induced Consulting Agreement.87  The issue 
before the Court was thus “whether a claim of fraud in the 
inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the federal 
court, or whether the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators.”88  
Holding that the fraudulent inducement claim would be submitted to 
arbitration, the Court adopted the separability doctrine: 
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause 
itself—an issue which goes to the “making” of the agreement to 
arbitrate—the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.  But the 
[FAA] does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud 
in the inducement of the contract generally.89 
                                                          
 81. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 82. Parker v. Ctr. for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297, 299 (Colo. App. 2000). 
 83. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 84. Id. at 397. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 398. 
 87. Id. at 399. 
 88. Id. at 402. 
 89. Id. at 403–04. 
PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:35 PM 
2012] ARTICLE III AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 219 
 
Thus, under the separability doctrine, a party alleging that it had 
been fraudulently induced to enter into a contract containing an 
arbitration clause will be required to arbitrate its fraudulent 
inducement claim, unless it alleges fraud specifically with respect to 
the arbitration provision itself. 
The separability doctrine undermines any notion that subjective 
intent is required to consent to an arbitration agreement because if a 
party is acting under the influence of a misrepresentation—even if 
that misrepresentation does not pertain specifically to the arbitration 
clause—it is not truly consenting.  Stephen Ware analogizes Prima 
Paint to a situation where a party signs a contract containing an 
arbitration clause because someone is pointing a gun at his head.90  
While a signature obtained at gunpoint—like a fraudulently induced 
signature—does objectively manifest assent to the terms of a 
contract, it does not represent the actual subjective desire of the 
signer.  Applying the separability doctrine to a case in which a 
plaintiff alleged that he signed a contract containing an arbitration 
clause at gunpoint and allowing the arbitrator to decide whether to 
enforce the contract “enforces a duty assumed through coerced, not 
voluntary, consent.”91  Likewise, if a plaintiff was fraudulently induced 
to enter a contract containing an arbitration provision, the 
separability rule enforces a duty assumed through fraud, not true 
knowing consent. 
In sum, while arbitration is ostensibly a creature of consent, several 
major aspects of current FAA jurisprudence—including determining 
consent through contract law objective manifestation of intent 
standards, enforcing arbitration agreements against non-parties, and 
applying the separability rule—reject the idea that such consent must 
represent the subjective, knowing intent of the parties. 
C. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards 
The final aspect of FAA jurisprudence relevant to determining 
whether it is consistent with Article III is judicial review of arbitration 
awards.  Under the FAA, judicial review of arbitration awards is 
extremely limited.  The Act requires a court to issue an order 
confirming an arbitration award upon the request of one of the 
parties, unless the award is vacated or modified for one of seven 
reasons specified in the FAA: 
                                                          
 90. Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration:  Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 22, at 88, 100–02. 
 91. Id. at 100. 
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(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) There was evident partiality or corruption in any of the 
arbitrators; 
(3) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct prejudicial to the 
rights of any party; 
(4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(5) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or mistake in 
describing persons or property in the award; 
(6) The arbitrators made an award on a matter not submitted to 
them; 
(7) The award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the  
merits.92 
These statutory grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitral 
award provide for a much narrower review than that typically given by 
an appellate court reviewing a lower court decision.  Indeed, while 
appellate courts review lower courts’ legal rulings de novo and factual 
findings for clear error,93 the statutory grounds for modification or 
vacatur of arbitral awards allow for review essentially only of the 
arbitrators’ conduct, not of the substance of the arbitrators’ factual or 
legal determinations on the merits of the dispute.94  As one court has 
explained: 
[T]he scope of judicial review [of] an arbitrator’s decision is 
among the narrowest known at law because to allow full scrutiny of 
such awards would frustrate the purpose of having arbitration at 
all—the quick resolution of disputes and the avoidance of the 
expense and delay associated with litigation.  Indeed . . . in 
reviewing such an award, a district or appellate court is limited to 
determin[ing] whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to 
                                                          
 92. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006). 
 93. See 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2588, at 443–57 (3d ed. 2008). 
 94. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (“[I]t 
would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated grounds [for 
review in the FAA] to the point of evidentiary and legal review generally.”); 
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  CASES AND PROBLEMS § 7.03, 
at 494 (2d ed. 2006) (“[T]he grounds on which courts review arbitration awards 
are much narrower than the grounds on which appeals courts review decisions of 
trial courts . . . .”); HUBER & WESTON, supra note 41, at 427 (“[T]hese grounds [for 
review of arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act] are narrower than the 
standards for appellate review in a judicial case where a court reviews a lower court’s 
legal rulings de novo and factual findings for clear error.”); Stephen Wills Murphy, 
Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 892 
(2010) (“Conspicuously absent from [the Federal Arbitration Act’s judicial review 
provisions] is the ability of the court to intervene and vacate an award for arbitrators’ 
substantive errors of law or fact.”). 
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do—not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but 
simply whether they did it.95 
In addition to the narrow statutory grounds for modifying or 
vacating an arbitration award, however, courts have historically—at 
least prior to 2008—endorsed various non-statutory grounds for 
vacating an arbitration award.96  Chief among these was the ground 
that the arbitrator’s decision was in “manifest disregard” of the law.97  
Under the manifest disregard standard, a court may vacate an arbitral 
award where the arbitrator “refus[ed] to apply a clearly defined legal 
principle known to the arbitrator to be controlling.”98  Manifest 
disregard of the law means something more than just a mistaken or 
erroneous determination or application of law,99 and thus review for 
manifest disregard is less searching than de novo review for 
correction of legal errors.  While other non-statutory grounds for 
vacating arbitral awards have been endorsed by various courts, like 
manifest disregard they are rather limited grounds for review and 
none of them adopt an appellate-court-like de novo review of legal 
determinations.100 
                                                          
 95. Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 
2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In addition, as a 
practical matter, reviewing an arbitral award on the merits can be difficult given that 
arbitrators are oftentimes not required to issue written opinions.  See BALES, supra 
note 5, at 133 (“The securities industry arbitration rules require the arbitrator to 
issue a written award, which does little more than state who shall receive what and 
when the individual shall receive it.  The arbitrator is not required to issue an opinion 
giving reasons for the award.” (footnote omitted)); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 558 (6th ed. 2012) (“[F]rom a 
practical perspective, the review of commercial arbitration awards on the merits is 
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.  The commonplace practice domestically 
has been to render awards without legal explanation or with only a limited 
explanation.  Additionally, informal arbitral proceedings usually are not codified in a 
verbatim transcript.”). 
 96. See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law?  The “Manifest Disregard of 
the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 146–47 (2011) (explaining that historically 
courts have vacated arbitration awards for several reasons, including making “some 
obvious mistake of law,” or committing “fraud, accident, mistake, or illegality”). 
 97. See id. at 158–59 (noting that “by 1999 every circuit court of appeals had 
adopted the manifest disregard standard”). 
 98. MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing:  The Future of 
Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 413 (2010) (quoting Jeffrey 
W. Sarles, US Courts Wrestle with “Manifest Disregard” After Hall Street, MAYER BROWN 
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/US-Courts-Wrestle-with-
Manifest-Disregard-after-IHall-StreetI-08-10-2009).  See generally Stephen L. Hayford, 
Law in Disarray:  Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. 
L. REV. 731, 774–78 (1996) (explaining the manifest disregard standard). 
 99. See Hayford, supra note 98, at 776–77; Sims & Bales, supra note 98, at 413. 
 100. See generally Hayford, supra note 98, at 778–98 (explaining non-statutory 
grounds for vacating arbitral awards including that the award is in direct conflict with 
public policy, is arbitrary and capricious, is completely irrational, or fails to draw its 
essence from the parties’ underlying contract); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of 
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In 2008, however, the Supreme Court appeared to put the kibosh 
on the use of non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitral awards when 
it decided Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.101  While Hall Street 
did not involve a judicially-created non-statutory review standard such 
as manifest disregard, but rather a contractually-created review 
standard that the parties had written into their arbitration 
agreement,102 the Court stated that “we granted certiorari to decide 
whether the grounds for vacatur and modification provided by . . . 
the FAA are exclusive [and] [w]e agree . . . that they are.”103  Despite 
the apparently clear language of the Court that the statute provides 
the exclusive grounds for vacatur or modification of arbitral awards, 
however, lower courts’ interpretations of Hall Street have been mixed. 
For example, while some circuits have read Hall Street as rejecting 
non-statutory grounds for modification or vacatur of arbitral 
awards,104 at least one circuit has held that non-statutory grounds such 
as manifest disregard remain permissible.105  A third, middle-ground 
position adopted by some circuits is that while Hall Street may have 
held that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award, manifest disregard survives as a judicial gloss on the 
express FAA ground allowing vacatur where an arbitrator has 
                                                          
Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/images 
/pdfs/817.pdf (characterizing manifest disregard, completely irrational, and against 
public policy as “equivalent”). 
 101. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 102. The arbitration agreement between the parties in Hall Street provided that 
“[t]he Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award:  (i) where the arbitrator’s 
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the 
arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.”  Id. at 579. 
 103. Id. at 581 (citation omitted). 
 104. E.g., Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); Ramos-
Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 
Crawford Grp., Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Hall Street 
for the proposition that “[a]n arbitral award may be vacated only for the reasons 
enumerated in the FAA”). 
 105. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418–19 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“In Hall Street Assocs., the Supreme Court significantly reduced the ability of 
federal courts to vacate arbitration awards for reasons other than those specified in 
[the FAA], but it did not foreclose federal courts’ review for an arbitrator’s manifest 
disregard of the law . . . .  Accordingly, this Court will follow its well-established 
precedent here and continue to employ the ‘manifest disregard’ standard.” (citation 
omitted)).  Various commentators have endorsed this view that the use of non-
statutory vacatur grounds survives Hall Street.  See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 100, at 13 
(“On the narrow reading of Hall Street that I propose, the FAA section 10 standards 
are ‘exclusive’ in the sense that private parties may not change or expand them by 
contract.  Such a holding is fully consistent with the continued vitality of judicially-
created vacatur doctrines.”); Sims & Bales, supra note 98, at 431–33 (arguing that 
manifest disregard survives Hall Street). 
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exceeded its powers.106  Adding to the confusion is the Supreme 
Court’s comment in a subsequent case that “[w]e do not decide 
whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street as an 
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the 
enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth [in the FAA].”107  
Nevertheless, at best, while some circuits may continue to allow 
manifest disregard or other originally non-statutory grounds for 
vacatur, as noted above, such grounds call for less-than-appellate-
court-like de novo review of legal determinations.  The relevant point 
here is that judicial review of arbitral awards is quite limited. 
II. THE FAA’S ARTICLE III PROBLEM 
As explained above, under the FAA, a broad range of disputes 
ostensibly assigned to Article III courts can be sent instead to 
arbitration with extremely limited judicial review.  This Part explores 
whether sending such disputes to arbitration is consistent with Article 
III, first by asking whether a conflict actually exists between the FAA 
and Article III, and second, after finding that one does, by 
determining whether any of the current judicial or scholarly 
approaches to non-Article III adjudication can resolve the conflict. 
A. Arbitrators and Judicial Power 
Article III allocates the exercise of judicial power over Article III 
disputes to life-tenured and salary-protected judges,108 which 
arbitrators are not.  If resolution of Article III disputes by arbitrators 
not subject to Article III tenure and salary requirements is the 
                                                          
 106. E.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“[W]e conclude that, after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard of the law 
remains a valid ground for vacatur because it is part of § 10(a)(4).”); Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[Other courts] 
think that ‘manifest disregard,’ reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific 
grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA, remains a valid ground for 
vacating arbitration awards.  We agree with those courts . . . .” (citations omitted)), 
rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).  This was the position of the Seventh 
Circuit even before Hall Street.  See Wise v. Wachovia Secs., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268 
(7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have defined ‘manifest disregard of the law’ so narrowly that 
it fits comfortably under the first clause of the fourth statutory ground [of the 
FAA].”).  In addition, while the Fourth Circuit has stated that manifest disregard 
survives Hall Street, it has not decided whether it survives as a judicial gloss on section 
10 or as a non-statutory ground.  Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 
(4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we find that manifest disregard continues to exist either 
as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which 
of the two it is . . . .”). 
 107. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3 (citation omitted). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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exercise of judicial power over such disputes, there is a potential 
conflict between Article III and the FAA.  Conversely, if arbitrators do 
not exercise judicial power, the FAA does not have an Article III 
problem. 
While Article III does not define “judicial power,” the term can be 
understood as the power to bindingly resolve a controversy between 
two or more disputants by determining facts and applying the law to 
those facts.109  Indeed, Blackstone’s Commentaries, with which the 
drafters of Article III were no doubt familiar,110 defines “judicial 
power” as the power “to examine the truth of the fact, to determine 
the law arriving upon that fact, and, if any injury appears to have 
been done, to ascertain and by its officers to apply the remedy.”111  
Determining facts, applying the law to those facts, and ascertaining a 
remedy to be applied to the parties is precisely what arbitrators do.112  
For example, one arbitration provider, the National Arbitration 
Forum, describes its arbitration services as “very similar to court” and 
states that “[i]n a FORUM arbitration, two disputing parties bring 
their dispute before a legal expert who renders a decision in favor of 
one of the parties based on the law and applicable rules.”113  
                                                          
 109. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 924 (defining “judicial power” 
as “[t]he authority vested in courts and judges to hear and decide cases and to make 
binding judgments on them; the power to construe and apply the law when 
controversies arise over what has been done or not done under it”); see also Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (“[A] ‘judicial Power’ is one to 
render dispositive judgments.” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990))); Craig A. Stern, What’s a Constitution Among 
Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1052–53 (1998) (“If 
[application of law to facts] is done for opposing parties by a neutral with the 
purpose of authoritatively pronouncing the law in officially resolving a dispute 
between these opponents, then it is an exercise of the judicial power.”). 
 110. See Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic:  A 
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 744–45 (1976) (noting that “a 
number of [Blackstone’s] readers and at least one of his former students were 
delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention,” and that his 
Commentaries “acted as a convenient reference work”); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension 
as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 614–15 (2009) (noting that Blackstone was 
one of the two “most influential English sources to which the Framers turned in 
shaping American law”). 
 111. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25. 
 112. One could argue that a relevant distinction between arbitration and judicial 
power is that while a judicial decision can invoke state power to enforce the decision 
(say by having a sheriff assist with collecting assets from a recalcitrant losing party), 
an arbitration award alone may be insufficient to do so.  See, e.g., FIA Card Servs., 
N.A. v. Weaver, 62 So. 3d 709, 712 (La. 2011) (“For an arbitral award to be made 
enforceable by law, it must first be confirmed by a court.”).  Given that an arbitration 
award can be turned into an enforceable judgment with extremely limited judicial 
review, see supra Part I.C, such a distinction seems a weak basis to argue that 
arbitrators do not exercise judicial power. 
 113. FAQ:  How is the FORUM Similar to a Court?, NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, 
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Bindingly resolving a dispute by applying law to determined facts in 
this way is the exercise of “judicial power” and, indeed, arbitrators 
are often characterized as private judges.114 
One could argue that arbitration is not the exercise of judicial 
power because arbitration is merely a glorified form of settlement.  
Certainly there is no Article III problem where two parties to a 
dispute that falls within Article III jurisdiction simply settle the 
dispute.  While settlement represents one kind of resolution of an 
Article III dispute, such self-resolution does not involve the exercise 
of “judicial power” over the dispute.  No third-party entity is 
determining facts, applying law to those facts, and issuing a resolution 
binding on the disputants.  Although a settlement agreement may be 
binding as a matter of contract, it is hard to argue that two parties 
who have agreed to settle a dispute have exercised “judicial power” 
in doing so.  As Craig Stern has noted, the word “judicial” derives 
from the Latin jus dicere (“to speak the law”), and “judicial power” is 
thus “an official ‘speaking of the law’ to other parties so as to resolve a 
dispute between them.” 115  While parties to a dispute may resolve it 
through anything from a handshake to a complex settlement 
agreement, it is hard to argue that when the parties themselves have 
negotiated a resolution (rather than having one bindingly imposed 
on them by a third-party adjudicator) that they have exercised 
“judicial power.”  As soon as a third party is brought in to render a 
                                                          
http://www.adrforum.com/faq.aspx?faq=872 (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).  Other 
arbitration providers describe arbitration similarly.  See, e.g., Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/arb_med (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“Arbitration is the 
submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision, 
known as an ‘award.’”); Arbitration Definition, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-
defined (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“The arbitrator reads briefs and documentary 
evidence, hears testimony, examines evidence and renders an opinion on liability and 
damages in the form of an ‘award of the arbitrator’ after the hearing.”); Arbitration 
Overview, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Overview 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“[Arbitrators] read the pleadings filed by the parties, listen to 
the arguments, study the documentary and/or testimonial evidence, and render a 
decision.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 119 (defining “arbitration” 
as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties . . . 
whose decision is binding”). 
 114. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854) (“Arbitrators are 
judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them . . . .”); W. 
Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite:  How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1091, 1097 (2012) (“[T]he service arbitrators provide to litigants—binding, 
third-party dispute resolution—is essentially the same as that provided by judges.”).  
For example, Anheuser-Busch’s employee dispute resolution system states that “[t]he 
arbitrator essentially substitutes for a judge and jury who might decide the case in a 
court setting.”  Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 2006) 
(quoting Anheuser-Busch Dispute Resolution Program Policy Statement). 
 115. Stern, supra note 109, at 1053–54 (emphasis added). 
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binding adjudication, however, even if brought in voluntarily by the 
parties, that third party is exercising judicial power, and thus 
potentially encroaching on Article III’s allocation of such power to 
Article III courts.116 
One could also make a textual argument that even if arbitrators 
bindingly adjudicating Article III disputes are exercising judicial 
power, they are not exercising the judicial power “of the United States,” 
which is what Article III allocates to life-tenured and salary-protected 
judges.117  The argument would be that because private arbitrators are 
not federal officers and part of some federal governmental entity, 
whatever judicial power they are exercising is not that of the United 
States.  But saying that a body is not exercising the judicial power of 
the United States because it is not a federal governmental entity 
misses the point.  The judicial power of the United States is the power 
to bindingly resolve disputes of the kind set out in Article III.  If an 
entity is exercising that power, it is exercising the judicial power of 
the United States, whether or not it is a federal governmental entity.  
Indeed, state courts adjudicating Article III disputes are exercising 
the judicial power of the United States.118  Similarly, though 
arbitrators, like state court judges, are not United States officers, they 
are nonetheless exercising the judicial power of the United States 
when they adjudicate Article III disputes.  While state court exercise 
of such judicial power is consistent with Article III because such 
resolution was clearly contemplated by the Framers and assumed to 
                                                          
 116. Professor Rutledge offers two additional reasons why arbitration should not 
be conflated with settlement.  First, he argues that arbitration involves less party 
autonomy than settlement because unlike in settlement, parties to arbitration are 
bound to the bargain before they know its substantive terms.  Second, he argues that 
greater judicial scrutiny is given to settlement agreements than to arbitration awards.  
Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1199–200. 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 118. See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the 
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007) 
[hereinafter Pfander, Federal Supremacy] (arguing that state courts adjudicating 
federal disputes are essentially inferior federal tribunals, which Congress has the 
power to constitute under Article I, § 8).  One could argue that Professor Pfander’s 
inferior tribunal account could be applied to arbitration, i.e., that an arbitral forum 
is simply an inferior federal tribunal constituted by Congress (through enactment of 
the Federal Arbitration Act) pursuant to its Article I, § 8 power.  A key element of 
Professor Pfander’s inferior tribunal theory, however, is the inferiority requirement, 
which includes appellate review by the Article III judiciary.  See Pfander, supra note 
12, at 689 (“[T]he inferiority requirement creates a foundational rule under which 
all tribunals must answer to the head of the Article III judiciary.”).  As discussed 
below, however, infra Part II.B.2, judicial review by Article III courts of arbitral awards 
is insufficient to justify arbitrators’ exercise of judicial power. 
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be part of the constitutional structure,119 however, no such historical 
or structural justification exists to support arbitrators’ similar 
adjudication of Article III disputes. 
Because arbitration is not simply a glorified form of settlement, 
and arbitrators bindingly resolve disputes by applying law to facts they 
determine, arbitrators exercise judicial power.  Further, to the extent 
arbitrators exercise such judicial power over disputes falling within 
the coverage of Article III, they are exercising the judicial power of 
the United States, which Article III assigns exclusively to life-tenured 
and salary-protected judges.  Thus, resolution of such disputes by 
arbitrators pursuant to the FAA is in tension with the literal mandate 
of Article III. 
B. The FAA and Current Theories of Non-Article III Adjudication 
While Article III literalism has been rejected by both courts and 
scholars, a uniform approach to determining when adjudication of 
Article III disputes by non-Article III bodies is constitutional has not 
emerged.  The Supreme Court has proposed both a categorical 
exceptions approach and a balancing test, while scholars have settled 
on what is termed appellate review theory.  As discussed below, 
however, none of these approaches render the FAA consistent with 
Article III. 
1. Supreme Court approaches:  Categorical exceptions and balancing 
Supreme Court precedent over the past thirty years on the 
constitutionality of adjudication of Article III disputes by non-Article 
III bodies has been less than illuminating.  In Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,120 a plurality of the Court 
endorsed a categorical approach to determining when Congress 
could constitutionally authorize the exercise of federal judicial power 
                                                          
 119. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 118, at 197–98 (“The Madisonian 
Compromise resulted in the adoption of language in Article III that empowers, but 
does not require, Congress to create lower federal courts.  Convention holds that 
Congress has broad freedom either to establish lower federal courts, or to leave 
matters to the state courts instead.” (footnote omitted)); see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. 
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 282–83 
(6th ed. 2009) (“[S]ince [under the Madisonian Compromise and the structural 
logic of Article III] Congress need not create any lower federal courts at all, state 
courts must be regarded as enjoying constitutional parity with the lower federal 
courts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 16, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]n 
every case in which [state courts] were not expressly excluded by the future acts of 
the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which 
those acts may give birth.”). 
 120. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
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by non-Article III tribunals.121  Specifically, Justice Brennan’s opinion 
for the Court held that there were “three narrow situations” not 
subject to the constitutional command that judicial power be 
exercised only by Article III courts.122  These three exceptions were 
territorial courts, courts-martial, and cases involving the adjudication 
of “public rights,” defined as those cases in which the government is 
a party.123 
In addition to these three exceptions to Article III, Justice 
Brennan’s opinion also stated that certain adjudicatory functions 
could be delegated to non-Article III “adjuncts” of Article III courts, 
so long as “the essential attributes of the judicial power” were 
retained by the Article III court.124  Justice Brennan referred to Crowell 
v. Benson125 and United States v. Raddatz126 as two cases in which use of 
non-Article III bodies had been justified as adjuncts to Article III 
courts.127  In Crowell, the Court upheld adjudication of worker injury 
claims by the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission,128 
and in Raddatz, the Court upheld the use of non-Article III magistrate 
judges to decide motions to suppress evidence in criminal matters.129  
In both Crowell and Raddatz, the essential attributes of judicial power 
remained in Article III district courts, because the district courts 
retained the ultimate power to decide the controversy.130  While 
Justice Brennan refused to call adjuncts an “exception” to Article 
                                                          
 121. Id. at 70 (plurality opinion). 
 122. Id. at 63–64. 
 123. Id. at 63–70. 
 124. Id. at 76–77 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). 
 125. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 126. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
 127. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77 (plurality opinion). 
 128. 285 U.S. at 64–65. 
 129. 447 U.S. at 686. 
 130. In Crowell, while factual findings of the Commission were generally 
considered final, rulings on questions of law were not, and “full opportunity [was] 
afforded for their determination by the Federal courts.”  285 U.S. at 45–46.  Thus, 
the essential attributes of judicial power remained in Article III courts.  See id. at 54 
(“[T]he reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides 
for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases.”).  In 
Raddatz, the Court noted that “Congress has provided that the magistrate’s proposed 
findings and recommendations shall be subjected to a de novo determination ‘by the 
judge who . . . then exercise[s] the ultimate authority to issue an appropriate 
order.’”  447 U.S. at 681–82 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-625, at 3 
(1976)); see also id. at 682 (“[T]he authority—and the responsibility—to make an 
informed, final determination . . . remains with the [Article III district court] judge.” 
(quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))); id. at 686 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Congress has vested in Art. III 
judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and 
impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory 
control over the assistants’ activities.”). 
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III,131 the result of the Northern Pipeline plurality was that it established 
a set of four categories in which non-Article III bodies could 
constitutionally exercise judicial power:  territorial courts, courts-
martial, public rights cases, and adjuncts to Article III courts. 
Shortly after Northern Pipeline, however, the Court expressly rejected 
this categorical approach to analyzing the proper use of non-Article 
III tribunals.  In Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,132 the 
Court stated that: 
[T]he constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of 
adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be assessed by 
reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article 
III.  This inquiry, in turn, is guided by the principle that practical 
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal 
categories should inform application of Article III.133 
In rejecting Northern Pipeline’s “doctrinaire reliance on formal 
categories,” Schor instead established a balancing test focusing on 
three main factors to determine whether a non-Article III body was 
impermissibly exercising judicial power, specifically: 
[1] [T]he extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial 
power” are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the 
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of 
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, 
[2] the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and 
[3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the 
requirements of Article III.134 
In its most recent opinion on the subject, however, the Court 
appears to have changed course once again, rejecting Schor’s 
balancing test and returning once again to the categorical approach 
of Northern Pipeline.  In Stern v. Marshall,135 the Court addressed 
whether adjudication of a common law tort claim by a bankruptcy 
court (whose judges do not enjoy Article III tenure and salary 
protections) was constitutional.136  In analyzing the issue, the Court 
did not use the balancing test from Schor, but rather asked whether 
the case fell within the public rights exception of Northern Pipeline,137 
                                                          
 131. See N. Pipeline 458 U.S. at 77 n.29 (plurality opinion) (“Congress’ power to 
create adjuncts and assign them limited adjudicatory functions is in no sense an 
‘exception’ to Art. III.”). 
 132. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 133. Id. at 847–48 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134. Id. at 851. 
 135. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 136. Id. at 2600–01. 
 137. Id. at 2611–15. 
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or, alternatively, whether bankruptcy courts could properly be 
considered adjuncts of Article III district courts.138  Stern suggests at 
least an implicit endorsement of Northern Pipeline’s categorical 
approach.  Indeed, Justice Scalia, one of five justices in the majority, 
wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing his support of Northern 
Pipeline’s categorical approach,139 and the four justice minority 
lamented the Court’s reliance on Northern Pipeline over Schor.140 
While seemingly reviving the Northern Pipeline categorical 
exceptions approach, the Court in Stern did alter one aspect of that 
approach:  it rejected Northern Pipeline’s limitation of public rights 
cases to cases to which the government was a party.141  Instead, it held 
that public rights cases (which can be adjudicated by non-Article III 
bodies under the categorical exceptions approach) are those in 
which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme or 
in which adjudication of the claim by the non-Article III tribunal is 
essential to some regulatory objective.142  “In other words,” the Court 
stated, “it is still the case that what makes a right ‘public’ rather than 
private is that the right is integrally related to particular federal 
government action.”143  The Court recognized, however, that this 
departure from Northern Pipeline’s bright-line rule that public rights 
cases are those to which the government is a party to a blurrier 
“integrally related” test could fail to provide concrete guidance in 
particular cases.144 
Can either of the Supreme Court’s approaches to non-Article III 
tribunals reconcile the FAA with Article III?  Under the categorical 
exceptions approach, exercise of judicial power by a non-Article III 
body is constitutional in four situations, three of which are based on 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 2618–19. 
 139. Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view an Article III judge is 
required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical 
practice to the contrary.  For that reason . . . I agree that Article III judges are not 
required in the context of territorial courts, courts-martial, or true ‘public rights’ 
cases.”).  By “true ‘public rights’ cases,” Scalia means, as Northern Pipeline held, cases 
arising between the government and others.  See id. (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
 140. See id. at 2622 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the majority . . . overstates 
the importance of an analysis that did not command a Court majority in Northern 
Pipeline and that was subsequently disavowed . . . [a]nd it fails to follow the analysis 
that this Court more recently has held applicable to the evaluation of claims of a 
kind before us here, namely, claims that a congressional delegation of adjudicatory 
authority violates separation-of-powers principles derived from Article III.” (citing 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986))). 
 141. Id. at 2613–14 (majority opinion). 
 142. Id. at 2613. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2615. 
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the nature of the tribunal, and one of which is based on the nature of 
the dispute.145  Thus, under this approach, courts-martial, territorial 
courts, and adjuncts to an Article III court may all exercise judicial 
power over Article III disputes.146  In addition, other non-Article III 
bodies may also adjudicate Article III disputes involving public 
rights.147 
Arbitration under the FAA is clearly neither a court-martial nor a 
territorial court.  Further, it is hard to argue that arbitrators act as 
adjuncts to Article III courts.  As noted above, under the adjunct 
categorical exception, certain adjudicatory functions can be 
delegated to non-Article III adjuncts of Article III courts so long as 
“the essential attributes of the judicial power” are retained by the 
Article III court.148  In the context of arbitration, however, no 
attributes of the judicial power are retained by an Article III court 
when an Article III dispute is sent to arbitration.  The arbitrator 
determines facts, applies the law to those facts, and issues an award 
binding on the parties.149  Other than confirming the award (subject 
to the extremely narrow grounds for vacatur),150 there is nothing left 
for an Article III court to do.  In the words of Stern quoting Northern 
Pipeline (both of which rejected arguments that bankruptcy courts are 
adjuncts of Article III courts), “the authority—and the 
responsibility—to make an informed, final determination . . . 
remains with” the arbitrators, not an Article III court.151  Thus, 
arbitrators are not adjuncts of Article III courts. 
Because arbitration under the FAA is not a court-martial, a 
territorial court, or an adjunct of an Article III court, it can be 
justified under the categorical exceptions approach only in public 
rights cases.152  As noted above, the Court in Stern explained that 
public rights cases are those in which the claim at issue derives from a 
federal regulatory scheme or in which adjudication of the claim by 
the non-Article III tribunal is essential to some regulatory objective.153  
Thus, disputes arising solely under state common law are not public 
                                                          
 145. See supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 147. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612–13. 
 148. See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra Part I.C. 
 151. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
 152. One could argue that arbitration should be a fifth categorical exception to 
Article III, but there is little to support such an argument.  See infra notes 194–98 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
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rights cases.154  To the extent such disputes arise between parties of 
diverse citizenship, they fall within the coverage of Article III,155 and 
to the extent such disputes also involve interstate commerce, 
arbitration of them is subject to the FAA.156  Yet because such disputes 
involve only private rights, arbitration of them under the FAA cannot 
be justified under the public rights exception. 
The only disputes subject to arbitration under the FAA that could 
possibly be justified under the public rights exception, then, would 
be federal statutory claims.  For example, employment discrimination 
claims arising under federal antidiscrimination statutes can be 
subjected to pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable under 
the FAA.157  While such disputes typically involve the liability of one 
private party to another, one could argue that they nevertheless 
involve public rights claims such that they need not be decided by an 
Article III court under the categorical exceptions approach of 
Northern Pipeline and Stern.158  Recall that Stern, departing somewhat 
from Northern Pipeline’s requirement that public rights cases involve 
the government as party, held that whether a claim is a public rights 
claim depends on whether the claim is “integrally related to 
                                                          
 154. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 (“Vickie’s counterclaim . . . does not fall within 
any of the varied formulations of the public rights exception in this Court’s cases. . . .  
The claim is instead one under state common law between two private parties.  It 
does not depend[] on the will of [C]ongress; Congress has nothing to do with it.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) (“[A] private right for which state law provides the 
rule of decision . . .  is . . . a claim of the kind assumed to be at the core of matters 
normally reserved to Article III courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 156. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 157. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) 
(holding that an ADEA claim can be subject to compulsory arbitration where neither 
the statute’s language nor the legislative history explicitly prohibits the possibility). 
 158. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures To Resolve 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 168 (2001) (“The 
various employment discrimination statutes involve both ‘private’ and ‘public’ rights.  
The specific individuals who file claims under those enactments may believe that they 
are asserting wholly ‘private’ rights, but the strong government interest in the 
elimination of pernicious discrimination renders the rights created by these laws 
‘public.’. . .  Under these circumstances, Congress would probably have the right to 
assign the adjudication of employment discrimination claims to Article I 
administrative procedures rather than to Article III judicial forums.”); Marcia L. 
McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 
73 (2011) (“Title VII and the other employment discrimination statutes do not fall 
perfectly into the public rights/private rights categories.  They involve both.”); 
Andrew P. Walsh, Note, Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.:  The “Foreign Laws” Exception to the 
ADEA—When a Collective Bargaining Agreement Equals a Law, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
455, 494 (1997) (“Employment discrimination statutes by their very nature concern 
‘public rights.’”). 
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particular federal government action.”159  One could potentially 
argue that private employment discrimination claims are “integrally 
related” to federal regulation of the workplace to ensure equal 
employment opportunity, and thus fall within the public rights 
exception.160  To the extent various statutory claims involve public 
rights, arbitration of such disputes pursuant to a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement made fully enforceable by the FAA may not be 
problematic with respect to Article III under the categorical 
exception for public rights cases. 
Nevertheless, such cases represent only a subset of all Article III 
disputes potentially subject to the FAA,161 and fully private claims do 
not fall within any of the categorical exceptions.  For example, even 
assuming that Title VII employment discrimination claims were 
public rights claims, and thus that compelling arbitration under the 
FAA of a sexual harassment claim would not conflict with Article III, 
compelling arbitration of related state law tort claims (such as assault 
or intentional infliction of emotional distress) would.162  Unlike 
courts-martial, territorial courts, and adjuncts, the public rights 
categorical exception focuses on the dispute, not the body 
adjudicating the dispute.  Consequently, while a public rights 
categorical exception could potentially justify arbitration under the 
FAA of some Article III disputes, it does not justify all such 
arbitration.  The categorical exceptions approach to non-Article III 
adjudication (set out in Northern Pipeline and potentially revived in 
Stern) thus does not save the FAA. 
Even if the Court’s decision in Stern did not revive the categorical 
approach, however, and the balancing approach laid out in Schor 
remains good law, the FAA does not fare any better.  Recall that 
under the balancing approach, the three factors to consider in 
determining whether a non-Article III body is impermissibly 
exercising Article III judicial power are: 
                                                          
 159. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 160. One making such an argument might look to Thomas v. Union Carbide 
Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that 
statutorily mandated arbitration of a dispute between two private parties arising 
under a federal pesticide registration law did not violate Article III because the claim 
at issue “b[ore] many of the characteristics of a ‘public’ right,” and was “an integral 
part” of a federal regulatory program. 
 161. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrates 
thousands of disputes each year involving private common law claims such as breach 
of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.  See Dispute Resolution Statistics, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/finradisputeresolution/ 
additionalresources/statistics (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 162. Assuming diverse parties. 
PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:35 PM 
234 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:201 
 
[1] [T]he extent to which “the essential attributes of judicial 
power” are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the 
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of 
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, 
[2] the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and 
[3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the 
requirements of Article III.163 
With respect to the first prong, as noted above in explaining why 
arbitration cannot be considered an adjunct of an Article III court, no 
essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts 
when arbitration of a federal dispute is compelled pursuant to the 
FAA.164  To the contrary, in disputes subject to arbitration, it is 
arbitrators, not courts, that “exercise[] the range of jurisdiction and 
powers normally vested only in Article III courts.”165  As explained 
above, the jurisdiction of arbitrators is broad, covering federal 
statutory claims as well as common law diversity disputes touching on 
interstate commerce (defined expansively).166  This broad range of 
disputes that arbitrators can adjudicate stands in stark contrast to the 
narrow jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) upheld in Schor under the balancing test.167  In upholding 
adjudication of certain disputes by that non-Article III body, the 
Court noted that the CFTC “deals only with a particularized area of 
law.”168  In addition, arbitrators also exercise a broad range of powers 
normally confined to the judiciary, including summoning witnesses to 
testify or provide other evidence169 and issuing a wide range of 
preliminary and final relief.170  Because under the FAA, arbitrators, 
not Article III courts, exercise the essential attributes of judicial 
power, application of the first prong of the balancing test cuts against 
the constitutionality of such arbitration. 
The second prong of the balancing test—the origins and 
importance of the right to be adjudicated—addresses the private 
                                                          
 163. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
 164. Supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
 165. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
 166. See supra Part I.A. 
 167. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850–57. 
 168. Id. at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“The arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any person 
to attend before them . . . as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them 
any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in 
the case.”). 
 170. DRAHOZAL, supra note 94, at 393 (“Most arbitration rules grant arbitrators 
the authority to award provisional measures.”); HUBER & WESTON, supra note 41, at 
374–75 (citing rules of leading arbitration organizations in which “arbitrators are 
accorded broad remedial powers”). 
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rights/public rights issue described above.171  Again, while some 
statutory claims subject to arbitration may arguably be public rights 
claims, and thus amenable to non-Article III adjudication, other 
disputes subject to arbitration under the FAA are not.172  The second 
prong thus potentially weighs in favor of the appropriateness of 
arbitration in resolving some Article III disputes, but not others. 
Finally, consideration of the third prong—the concerns that drove 
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III—seems, like 
the first prong, to cut against the consistency of FAA arbitration with 
Article III.  The purpose behind passage of the FAA was to ensure 
enforcement of arbitration agreements,173 and one of the primary 
motivations for Congress to make arbitration agreements enforceable 
was the perceived cost and efficiency advantages of arbitration over 
litigation.174  Congressional concern over non-enforcement of 
purportedly cheap and efficient arbitration agreements, however, 
stands in stark contrast to the concerns that drove Congress to 
establish the system of non-Article III CFTC adjudication upheld in 
Schor.  In Schor, the Court noted that in authorizing the CFTC to 
adjudicate certain kinds of disputes, Congress’s “primary focus was 
on making effective a specific and limited regulatory scheme, not on 
allocating jurisdiction among federal tribunals.” 175  The specific and 
limited regulatory scheme in Schor was oversight of the “volatile and 
esoteric futures trading complex” by the CFTC, an agency that 
“would be relatively immune” from politics.176  In contrast, the FAA’s 
transfer of dispute resolution from federal courts to arbitration for 
reasons of cost and efficiency does not make effective some specific 
and limited regulatory regime, but simply allocates jurisdiction 
                                                          
 171. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 853 (noting that whether the claim at issue is a private 
right, which is “assumed to be at the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to Article III 
courts,” while not dispositive, “has significance in [the] Article III analysis”). 
 172. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–21 (1985) 
(discussing congressional intent to ensure that agreements to arbitrate carried equal 
effect to other contracts). 
 174. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“It is practically appropriate that [the 
FAA should be passed] at this time when there is so much agitation against the 
costliness and delays of litigation.  These matters can be largely eliminated by 
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and 
enforceable.”); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The desire to avoid the delay and 
expense of litigation persists.  The desire grows with time and as delays and expenses 
increase.”); supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (discussing “two goals of the Arbitration 
Act—enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy 
dispute resolution” (quoting Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221)). 
 175. 478 U.S. at 855. 
 176. Id. at 836. 
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among adjudicatory bodies. 
Other than application of the second prong to the subset of public 
rights disputes, all prongs of the Schor balancing test weigh against 
finding the FAA consistent with Article III.  Consequently, neither of 
the Supreme Court’s approaches, categorical exceptions or 
balancing, justifies arbitration under the FAA as a non-Article III 
tribunal. 
2. Scholarly approach:  Appellate review theory 
As James Pfander has pointed out, “[s]cholars have expressed little 
enthusiasm for either the Court’s categorical approach or its 
balancing approach.”177  The leading alternative to the Court’s 
approaches offered by scholars is appellate review theory.178  
Appellate review theory asserts that the exercise of judicial power 
over an Article III dispute by a non-Article III body is constitutional 
so long as the non-Article III body’s decisions are subject to 
sufficiently searching appellate review by an Article III court.179  One 
                                                          
 177. Pfander, supra note 12, at 665 & n.111 (citing Paul M. Bator, The 
Constitution as Architecture:  Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 
IND. L.J. 233, 248–51, 257–58 (1990); Fallon, supra note 10, at 926–29; Richard B. 
Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III:  Legislative Court Doctrine in the 
Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 101–06 (1988)).  Professor Pfander 
himself likewise shows little enthusiasm for either the categorical or balancing 
approaches.  Pfander, supra note 12, at 671 (“In the end, the available models of the 
relationship between Article I and Article III all suffer from serious difficulties.”). 
 178. Pfander, supra note 12, at 666 (noting that “an appellate review theory of 
judicial power, in one form or another, has fared best”); see also infra note 179.  
Professor Pfander offers what he terms an “inferior tribunals” approach to analyzing 
non-Article III tribunals.  Pfander, supra note 12, at 650–51.  While this approach, 
grounded as it is in the Inferior Tribunals Clause of Article I, may offer a more solid 
textual foundation than appellate review theory, it is, as noted by Caleb Nelson, more 
a supplement to appellate review theory than a substitute for it.  See Nelson, supra 
note 12, at 616 n.230.  In contrast to the scholars endorsing appellate review theory, 
Craig Stern endorses the categorical exceptions approach of Northern Pipeline, 
although he argues that “exceptions” is a misnomer.  Stern, supra note 109, at 1076 
(“The text of the Constitution permits courts-martial, territorial courts, executive 
adjudication of public rights, and the participation of judicial adjuncts⎯all without 
the protection of [Article III’s salary and tenure provisions]. . . .  The provenance of 
the so-called ‘exceptions’ to Article III rests upon the Constitution, not upon an 
unprincipled departure from the Constitution under the guise of historical 
necessity.”). 
 179. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 933 (“The core claim of [appellate review theory] 
is that sufficiently searching review of a legislative court’s or administrative agency’s 
decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements of article III.”); 
Redish, supra note 12, at 227 (“[I]f in every case falling within the judicial power 
there exists an opportunity for review in an article III court, it would seem that the 
constitutional requirement that the judicial power ‘be vested’ in these courts is fully 
satisfied.”); Saphire & Solimine, supra note 177, at 139 (“[W]e conclude that the 
mandate of article III is only satisfied when Congress, in creating a non-article III 
tribunal, makes available article III review of that tribunal’s factual and legal 
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attractive element of appellate review theory is that it is at least “an 
absolute construction” of Article III—a construction that does not 
rely on the nature of the claim adjudicated—in contrast to both the 
Supreme Court’s categorical approach, which distinguishes between 
public and private rights, and its balancing approach, which looks to 
the origin and importance of the right to be adjudicated.180 
Appellate review theory is based on two premises.181  First, given the 
institutional and doctrinal history of non-Article III bodies, Congress 
should have the discretion to authorize the use of such bodies to 
make initial adjudications of Article III disputes.182  Second, however, 
notwithstanding this history and the importance of non-Article 
tribunals, the underlying values of Article III—which include 
individual disputants’ interest in impartial adjudication as well as 
structural interests in maintaining proper separation of powers183—
must not be forgotten or balanced away.184  From these two premises, 
appellate review theory holds that while disputes ostensibly falling 
within the coverage of Article III may, in the first instance, be heard 
by a non-Article III adjudicator,185 the decision of the non-Article III 
body must be subject to sufficiently searching review by an Article III 
court.  Specifically, appellate review theory provides that legal 
determinations made by the non-Article III body must be subject to 
independent de novo review by an Article III court,186 though 
                                                          
determinations.”).  For one criticism of appellate review theory, see Troy A. 
McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
747, 772, 777–92 (2010), which explains that “[w]hen viewed in light of the 
operation of the bankruptcy courts . . . the appellate review theory advanced by 
scholars leave[s] much to be desired.” 
 180. See Redish, supra note 12, at 226–27 (noting the desirability of an absolute 
construction of Article III, such as appellate review theory offers, because the 
language of Article III appears to tolerate no exceptions to its requirements).  But see 
Nelson, supra note 12, at 616–20 (noting that “[i]n academic circles . . . the appellate 
review theory of Article III is often perceived as a unitary approach that does not vary 
according to the type of legal interests being adjudicated,” but explaining that “[o]n 
closer inspection, [the theory] does not actually transcend the public/private 
distinction”). 
 181. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 917–18.  Professor Fallon is generally credited 
with providing the “leading account” of appellate review theory.  See, e.g., Nelson, 
supra note 12, at 614–15; Pfander, supra note 12, at 666.  For a brief discussion of 
some of the minor variations among scholars endorsing appellate review theory, see 
Nelson, supra note 12, at 615 n.230. 
 182. Fallon, supra note 10, at 917. 
 183. See id. at 937–43 (describing Article III values, including “fairness to litigants” 
and separation of powers); infra Part III.B.1. 
 184. Fallon, supra note 10, at 917–18. 
 185. See id. at 949. 
 186. See id. at 982–83; Saphire & Solimine, supra note 177, at 142–44; see also 
Redish, supra note 12, at 227–28 (calling for “nondeferential review” of agency 
interpretations of law by Article III courts). 
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determinations of fact may be subject only to a more deferential 
inquiry into whether the factual findings are supported by substantial 
evidence.187 
Unfortunately, appellate review theory does not fare any better 
than the categorical exceptions and balancing test in resolving the 
tension between Article III and the FAA.  While appellate review 
theory requires sufficiently searching Article III review of decisions 
by non-Article III tribunals, as discussed above, judicial review of 
arbitral awards under the FAA is extremely limited.188  The statutory 
grounds set forth in the FAA allow for review essentially only of the 
arbitrators’ conduct, not of the substance of their factual or legal 
determinations.189  Further, to the extent any non-statutory grounds 
of review by Article III courts, such as “manifest disregard,” survive 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, such review falls short of 
the de novo review of legal determinations required by appellate 
review theory.190  Consequently, adjudication of Article III disputes 
by arbitrators under the FAA cannot be justified under appellate 
review theory.191 
                                                          
 187. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 989; Saphire & Solimine, supra note 177, at 
143–44; see also Redish, supra note 12, at 227 (questioning whether review of factual 
findings under a substantial evidence test provides for meaningful appellate review, 
but conceding that such limited review may be appropriate). 
 188. Supra Part I.C. 
 189. Supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 190. Supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text.  Arbitrators routinely make 
determinations of law.  Even at the time of the Federal Arbitration Act’s enactment it 
was clear that arbitrators make such determinations.  See Joint Hearings on Arbitration, 
supra note 47, at 27 (statement of Alexander Rose, representing the Arbitration 
Society of America) (“I never knew of an arbitration where questions of law were not 
to be passed upon . . . .”). 
 191. Professor Rutledge has proposed a “modified appellate review theory,” which 
he asserts would justify arbitration under the FAA.  Under this modified appellate 
review theory, the fact that arbitration is a voluntary undertaking lessens the need for 
plenary Article III review.  Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1216.  According to Professor 
Rutledge, this lessened need allows for Article III review at some standard less than 
de novo, which he argues is satisfied by review for “manifest disregard.”  Id. at 1226 
(“[U]nder modified appellate review theory, the manifest disregard doctrine 
arguably supplies the necessary degree of federal appellate review.  The voluntariness 
of the undertaking justifies a reduced role for federal courts.  At the same time, the 
manifest disregard doctrine preserves a limited role for federal courts vindicating the 
Article III values still present in an arbitration scheme.”).  There are two problems 
with this analysis.  First, in many cases it is questionable whether arbitration—even 
pursuant to a purported agreement—is truly voluntary and thus justifying under 
modified appellate review theory a lesser standard of review.  See generally supra Part 
I.B.  Second, Professor Rutledge’s reliance on manifest disregard to supply such 
lesser review likely does not survive Hall Street.  See Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1227 
n.155 (noting that Hall Street was decided just before his article went to press). 
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III. REMEDYING THE PROBLEM 
Given that private arbitration under the FAA is not consistent with 
Article III under any of the judicial192 or scholarly approaches193 to 
non-Article III adjudication, the question becomes whether there is 
any other way to resolve the tension.  One possibility would be to 
create a categorical exception to Article III for arbitration.  Another 
potential fix would be to amend the FAA to permit more searching 
judicial review of arbitration awards.  As discussed below, however, 
neither of these solutions is ultimately satisfactory. 
A. A Categorical Exception?  More Searching Review? 
One could argue that arbitration under the FAA should simply be 
considered an additional exception to Article III literalism, and thus 
justified under the categorical exceptions approach of Northern 
Pipeline and Stern.  Yet, while the current exceptions for courts-
martial, territorial courts, and public rights cases are premised on 
historical precedent,194 no such historical precedent exists to support 
a categorical exception for arbitration.195  As discussed above,196 prior 
to enactment of the FAA, disputes brought in court were not typically 
sent to arbitration, regardless of any arbitration agreement between 
the parties.  Courts generally would not enforce arbitration 
agreements and, in fact, it was this traditional judicial hostility to 
arbitration that the FAA was intended to overcome.197  Thus, there 
seems to be little to support a historically-based categorical exception 
for arbitration.198 
                                                          
 192. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 193. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 194. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[I]n my view an Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless 
there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary.” (emphasis omitted)); 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (noting that the exceptions recognize “historically . . . exceptional” 
circumstances and that Article III “must be interpreted in light of the historical 
context”).  Recall that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline refused 
to call adjuncts an “exception” to Article III.  Adjuncts were justified not on 
historical precedent, but because the “essential attributes of judicial power” were 
retained by Article III courts in such cases.  See supra notes 124–31 and 
accompanying text. 
 195. But see Geraldine A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1931) (“[R]eference of 
maritime controversies to arbitration ha[s] long been common practice.” (quoting 
Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 122 (1924))), aff’d sub nom. Marine 
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932))). 
 196. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
 198. Another potential downside of justifying arbitration as a new categorical 
exception to Article III is the risk that goes with choosing a side in an ongoing Article 
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Another option for reconciling the FAA with Article III would be to 
authorize Article III courts to perform de novo review over legal 
determinations made by arbitrators.  While such a change would 
justify FAA arbitration under the appellate review theory proposed by 
scholars,199 there are two main problems with this option.  First, in 
light of Hall Street’s holding that the narrow statutory grounds in the 
FAA for modification or vacatur of arbitral awards are exclusive,200 
granting Article III courts de novo review power would require a 
legislative change to the act.201  Relying on Congress to remedy the 
statute may not be the most effective way to solve the problem.  As 
Amanda Frost has noted, “[a]lthough Congress always has the power 
to amend legislation, Congress is busy and has limited resources, and 
so more often than not would leave even problematic legislation in 
place.”202  Second, even if Congress had the time and resources to 
amend the FAA to provide for de novo review by Article III courts, it 
is not at all clear that such an amendment is desirable.  While 
requiring sufficient appellate review of arbitral awards may make the 
act consistent with Article III, it would tend to undermine one of the 
primary motivations behind the FAA, namely to provide for quick, 
inexpensive, informal resolution of disputes.203  Any expansion of 
appellate review beyond the limited review originally called for by the 
FAA undermines that purpose.204 
                                                          
III debate.  Should the Supreme Court ultimately reject the categorical exceptions 
approach to non-Article III adjudication generally (as it appeared to before Stern 
undermined Schor), a new justification for arbitration would be needed. 
 199. See supra Part II.B.2.  In addition, such a change could potentially justify FAA 
arbitration under the balancing approach and the adjunct categorical exception 
because allowing de novo review would arguably allow Article III courts to retain 
“essential attributes of the judicial power,” the basis for the adjunct exception, see 
supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text, and the first prong of the balancing 
approach, see supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text; see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. 
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). 
 201. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 202. Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2007). 
 203. See supra notes 44, 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 204. See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 588 (noting that the FAA judicial review sections 
provide “just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of 
resolving disputes straightaway” and suggesting that a broader review standard would 
“open[] the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render 
informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming 
judicial review process and bring arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration 
process” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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B. Waiver Theory 
Having explained that arbitration is fundamentally inconsistent 
with Article III under the leading judicial and scholarly approaches to 
adjudication by non-Article III bodies, and having determined that 
the two possible remedies to this inconsistency are ultimately 
unsatisfactory, this Article does not go on to conclude that simply 
striking down the FAA as unconstitutional is the answer.205  Instead, it 
asks whether disputants may waive the FAA’s Article III problem and 
have their federal dispute resolved by an arbitrator nonetheless.  As 
discussed below, whether disputants may waive Article III problems 
depends on the nature of the interests protected by Article III. 
1. Individual and structural concerns 
In Schor, the Supreme Court explained that Article III’s 
requirement of an independent adjudicator with life tenure and 
salary protections safeguards two separate interests:  “Article III, § 1, 
not only preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and 
independent federal adjudication of claims within the judicial power 
of the United States, but also serves as an inseparable element of the 
constitutional system of checks and balances.”206 
The Court further held that to the extent Article III protects the 
personal rights of disputants to adjudication by a life-tenured and 
salary-protected adjudicator, those rights may be waived.207  On the 
other hand, to the extent Article III’s salary and tenure protections 
safeguard against encroachment on the judiciary by the legislative or 
executive branches, and against aggrandizement of those other 
branches at the judiciary’s expense, such concerns cannot be waived 
by the disputants.208 
                                                          
 205. Such a result is unlikely to occur in any event.  See Reuben, supra note 23, at 
978 n.123 (“[I]t is implausible to imagine the Supreme Court striking down the 
[FAA] at this point, given the body of law that has developed under it and the 
widespread national and international reliance on its validity.”). 
 206. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 
(2011) (noting that Article III “serve[s] two related purposes,” protecting 
individuals and protecting each branch of government); Fallon, supra note 10, at 
937–43 (describing Article III values, including “fairness to litigants,” and 
separation of powers). 
 207. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49 (“[A]s a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an 
impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other 
personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal 
matters must be tried.”). 
 208. Id. at 850–51 (“To the extent that this structural principal is implicated in a 
given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty . . . .  
When these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot 
PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:35 PM 
242 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:201 
 
The idea that Article III creates a personal right waivable by 
individual disputants is not without its critics.  In Schor itself, Justice 
Brennan dissented, arguing that “[b]ecause the individual and 
structural interests served by Article III are coextensive, I do not 
believe that a litigant may ever waive his right to an Article III 
tribunal where one is constitutionally required.”209  Professor 
Rutledge similarly argues that Article III problems are not waivable by 
disputants because nothing in the text, structure, or history of Article 
III suggests that it confers a personal right.210  While it is true that 
Article III does not expressly state that its tenure and salary provisions 
establish an individual right in disputants to an independent 
decision-maker with these protections, it was not a stretch for the 
Schor majority to find such a personal right.  To read Article III as not 
conferring a personal right to a life-tenured and salary-protected 
adjudicator would be to render the requirement a meaningless 
formalism.  Protection of the judiciary from the other branches alone 
cannot explain the judicial insulation provisions of Article III.  As 
Rebecca Brown has noted, “separation of powers is not an end in 
itself.”211  The tenure and salary provisions of Article III protect 
individuals,212 and it was thus not unreasonable for the majority in 
Schor to read such provisions as conferring personal, individual 
rights.213  Indeed, Alexander Hamilton argued that the structural 
provisions of the Constitution protected individual rights such that a 
separate bill of rights would be superfluous.214 
                                                          
be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties 
cannot be expected to protect.”). 
 209. Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 210. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1197–99. 
 211. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1516 (1991). 
 212. See id. at 1538 (arguing that the structural provisions of the Constitution, 
including separation of powers, provided protection of individual rights); see also 
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United States 
Territories:  The Case of American Samoa, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 379, 432 (1991) (“The core 
of article III is the independence of the judiciary.  The self-evident purpose of 
judicial independence is to provide a fair and impartial tribunal for litigants.”). 
 213. One interesting question that arises from a finding that Article III creates a 
personal, individual right to a life-tenured and salary-protected adjudicator for 
federal disputes is whether corporate disputants also enjoy this constitutional right.  
See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.:  Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future 
of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 909–14 (2011) (explaining the 
“broken jurisprudence of corporate constitutional rights”). 
 214. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 16, at 581 (Alexander Hamilton) (urging 
ratification of the Constitution even absent an express bill of rights, noting that “the 
constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF 
RIGHTS”); see also Brown, supra note 211, at 1515 (“[O]nce the body of the 
Constitution was essentially complete, some opposed the addition of a bill of 
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Assuming, then, that Schor properly read Article III as conferring 
an individual right to a life-tenured and salary-protected judge, such a 
right is waivable.  To the extent Article III also protects the judiciary 
more generally from encroachment by the other branches, however, 
such structural protections are not waivable by individual disputants 
in any particular case.  Where such structural concerns are not 
implicated, however, parties remain free to waive their personal right 
to an Article III judge.  A primary example of such a situation is 
consent jurisdiction of magistrate judges.  Federal magistrate judges 
do not enjoy Article III’s tenure and salary protections.215  
Nevertheless, under the Federal Magistrates Act, parties to a federal 
case can consent to have a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings 
in the matter and enter a final order.216  Absent consent of the parties, 
it is unlikely that complete adjudication of the dispute and entry of 
judgment by a non-Article III magistrate would pass constitutional 
muster.217  Nevertheless, consent of the parties cures any 
constitutional defect.218  Parties may waive their right to an Article III 
forum in these circumstances because adjudication by a magistrate 
judge does not implicate any structural separation of powers 
concerns.  In an en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, then-Judge 
Kennedy noted that magistrate adjudication by consent does not 
present “the paradigmatic separation of powers case, where the 
integrity of one branch is threatened by another,” and that, among 
other things, magistrates are not directly dependent on the legislative 
or executive branches because the selection and retention of 
magistrates is the responsibility of Article III judges.219 
                                                          
rights on the ground that the structure of the government, with its own self-
limiting principles, would make any express protection of individual liberties 
superfluous . . . .”). 
 215. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2006) (providing that federal magistrate judges are 
appointed by United States District Court judges for eight-year terms). 
 216. Id. § 636(c)(1). 
 217. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 
F.2d 537, 542 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“A mandatory provision for trial of an 
unrestricted class of civil cases by a magistrate and not by Article III judges would 
violate the constitutional rights of the litigants.”). 
 218. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, the circuit 
courts have uniformly held that party consent to adjudication of civil disputes by 
magistrates cures any constitutional defects.  See A Constitutional Analysis of 
Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 252 n.3 (1993) (citing cases).  Indeed, 
the legitimacy of magistrates’ consent jurisdiction is so well established that one 
court has held that challenging it was “abusive of the judicial process.”  D.L. Auld 
Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 219. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544–45; see also 28 U.S.C. § 631 (stating that the 
responsibility for appointment and removal of magistrates belongs to federal district 
judges). 
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Like consent jurisdiction of magistrate judges, private arbitration 
under the FAA does not implicate the non-waivable structural 
concerns of Article III.  While the FAA represents a diminishment of 
the Article III judiciary by removing from it the adjudication of some 
subset of cases it would otherwise decide, there is no corresponding 
aggrandizement of the legislative or executive branches.  When 
Article III disputes are removed from the judiciary and resolved by 
either administrative or legislative courts, those disputes are resolved 
by adjudicators controlled by the other branches of the federal 
government.220  In contrast, when Article III disputes are removed 
from the judiciary pursuant to the FAA, they are resolved by 
adjudicators who remain as independent of the executive and 
legislative branches as they are of the judicial branch.  Indeed, 
arbitration arguably diminishes the power of all three branches, given 
the executive and legislative branches’ roles in selecting Article III 
judges.221  In any event, the FAA’s diminishment of the federal 
judiciary without a corresponding aggrandizement of another branch 
of government fails to implicate the non-waivable structural concerns 
of Article III.222 
In arguing that arbitration nonetheless implicates non-waivable 
Article III structural concerns even absent aggrandizement of the 
other branches, Professor Rutledge asserts that Congress is (1) 
                                                          
 220. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (providing that “[a]n action [including removal, 
suspension, or reduction in pay] may be taken against an administrative law 
judge . . . by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed”); 
26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (“Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by the President, 
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office . . . .”). 
 221. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (setting forth the role of the President to 
appoint judges with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
 222. Adjudication of federal disputes by state courts provides another example of 
diminishment of the federal judiciary without corresponding aggrandizement of the 
other federal branches.  Where parties file in state court and fail to remove to federal 
court cases that could otherwise be brought in federal court, they essentially waive 
their right to Article III adjudication, and state court adjudication of Article III 
disputes does not implicate structural separation of powers concerns.  See N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 n.15 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (“Congress has no control over state-court judges; accordingly the 
principle of separation of powers is not threatened by leaving the adjudication of 
federal disputes to such judges.”); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial 
Independence:  Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 
304 (1981) (“Because untenured state court judges are not appointed, confirmed, 
paid or removed by Congress, no separation of powers principle is violated by 
permitting Congress to leave application of its statutes to these judges.”).  Clearly, 
state court adjudication of federal disputes does not violate Article III, although 
one could argue that state courts are a unique non-Article III tribunal that the 
framers intended would resolve federal disputes.  See generally supra notes 118–19 
and accompanying text. 
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stripping the courts of their power to interpret the meaning of 
federal law (and depriving the public of valuable precedent), and (2) 
commandeering the courts when it requires them to enforce 
arbitration awards.223  With respect to the first point, while Congress 
may be reducing the opportunity for federal courts to develop 
precedent by allowing parties to avoid Article III adjudication (and 
thereby reducing the number of disputes presented to Article III 
courts), the FAA in no way “strip[s] federal courts of the power to 
interpret the meaning of federal law and erect[s] a system by which 
others, namely arbitrators, can define it,” as argued by Professor 
Rutledge.224  The FAA has no impact on how Article III courts 
interpret federal law and establish precedent in those cases that come 
before them, nor do arbitrators define federal law.225  Unless all 
disputants voluntarily agree to arbitrate every Article III dispute, 
thereby removing every private case from Article III adjudication—a 
highly unlikely scenario—Article III courts retain the opportunity to 
interpret law and establish precedent, with neither Congress nor 
arbitrators affecting how they do so.226  Further, to the extent 
disputants comply with arbitration agreements without resorting to 
the FAA for enforcement, they are denying Article III courts the 
opportunity to interpret law and establish precedent in their case—
the concerns identified by Professor Rutledge—without any 
congressional action at all (other than to the extent that the FAA 
casts a shadow over disputants’ decision to comply with an arbitration 
agreement).  Such arbitration without FAA enforcement, while still 
                                                          
 223. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1201.  Professor Sternlight makes a claim similar 
to Professor Rutledge’s first argument when she states that arbitration “threatens 
the existence of the judicial branch by privatizing a substantial number of claims 
that would otherwise have been heard by Article III courts.”  Sternlight, supra note 
20, at 79. 
 224. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1201. 
 225. See Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration:  Destruction of the Common Law, 
2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11–12 (2003) (“[A]rbitration lacks the ability to formulate policy or 
change existing law.”); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private:  The Quiet 
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 785 (2002) (“Where cases are 
decided by courts of law, in reported decisions, a substantial change of direction by 
the decision-makers will be a matter of public record.  Since arbitration decisions do 
not have this public quality, neither a tendency to follow past decisions nor a resolve 
to depart from them would be a matter of public record.  So neither kind of law—the 
precedent-respecting or the precedent-rejecting—is thereby created.”). 
 226. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31–32 (1991) 
(rejecting the argument that allowing arbitration of ADEA claims would result in “a 
stifling of the development of the law” because “judicial decisions addressing ADEA 
claims will continue to be issued because it is unlikely that all or even most ADEA 
claimants will be subject to arbitration agreements”). 
PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:35 PM 
246 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:201 
 
the exercise of judicial power by a non-Article III body,227 clearly raises 
no structural separation of powers concerns, suggesting that simply 
denying courts opportunities to interpret law and make precedent is 
not sufficient. 
With respect to Professor Rutledge’s second point, it is just not 
clear how Congress can be said to be “commandeering” the federal 
judiciary through the FAA’s requirement that courts confirm 
arbitration awards.  Professor Rutledge analogizes to Printz v. United 
States228 where the Court held that Congress could not commandeer 
state officials to administer federal gun control regulations under the 
Brady Act.229  While Professor Rutledge acknowledges that Printz dealt 
with federal-state relations, not federal inter-branch separation of 
powers issues, he fails to explain either how exactly the Printz anti-
commandeering principle translates to such horizontal separation of 
powers issues or how the FAA’s requirement that courts confirm 
arbitration awards commandeers the federal judiciary in the same 
way that Congress commandeered state law enforcement officers 
through the Brady Act.  It does not violate separation of powers 
principles for Congress to dictate to courts the situations in which 
they should render judgment for one side or another (such as where 
one side has obtained an award from an arbitrator).  Indeed, that is 
precisely the proper role of the legislature vis-à-vis the judiciary.230  
Regardless, at the end of the day, aggrandizement of other branches 
seems ultimately to be the fundamental separation of powers 
concern,231 which, as Professor Rutledge acknowledges, is simply 
lacking with respect to arbitration under the FAA.232  Indeed, in Schor 
                                                          
 227. See supra Part II.A. 
 228. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 229. Id. at 933; Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1201 (stating that Printz demonstrates 
“separation of powers principles generally prohibit the commandeering of another 
branch of government”). 
 230. See A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 475–76 (2000) 
(“Courts exist to resolve disputes.  Implicit in that role is the requirement that judges 
interpret and enforce the law . . . and that function requires judges to follow 
commands issued by others . . . .  Therefore, being commandeered is inherent in 
being a judge . . . .”). 
 231. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1127, 1147–48 (2000) (noting that despite surface disagreement, “courts and 
commentators agree on the following objective:  The system of separation of powers 
is intended to prevent a single governmental institution from possessing and 
exercising too much power”). 
 232. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1200.  Arguably the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Pacemaker authored by then-Judge Kennedy could be read to suggest that erosion of 
the judiciary alone (even absent corresponding aggrandizement of the other 
branches) can implicate non-waivable structural concerns.  In Pacemaker, the Ninth 
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itself, the Supreme Court noted that “Congress may encourage 
parties to . . . resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions 
on the separation of powers.”233 
Simply stated, the FAA implicates only the personal rights aspect 
of Article III and not any structural separation of powers concerns.  
As a result, disputants can waive their right to have an Article III 
judge adjudicate their dispute in favor of resolution by a non-
Article III arbitrator.234 
2. Implications for FAA consent jurisprudence 
Acknowledging that the FAA is fundamentally inconsistent with 
Article III and that waiver theory offers the only feasible justification 
for compelling arbitration of Article III disputes raises to 
constitutional importance the question of disputants’ consent to 
arbitration.  As explained above, under current FAA jurisprudence, 
consent to arbitration is generally measured by a contract law 
objective manifestation of intent standard.235  Yet it is not at all clear 
that this is the proper standard for determining whether disputants 
                                                          
Circuit held that consenting to adjudication by a magistrate was consistent with 
Article III.  In so holding, the court noted that in addition to magistrates not being 
subject to the control of either the legislative or executive branches, Article III courts 
retained some control over magistrate consent jurisdiction.  Pacemaker Diagnostic 
Clinic of Am., Inc v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1984) (en 
banc).  Nevertheless, while such Article III control over magistrates certainly 
supported the court’s finding that non-waivable structural separation of powers 
concerns were not implicated, it is not clear that such additional control is necessary 
where, as in the case of adjudication by both magistrates and arbitrators, other 
branches’ power is not aggrandized.  Indeed, adjudication of Article III disputes by 
state court judges (who are similarly not answerable to Congress or the Executive) 
does not implicate Article III structural separation of powers concerns despite a lack 
of the kinds of control by Article III courts noted in Pacemaker.  See supra note 219 
and accompanying text. 
 233. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986). 
 234. Some have argued that once a dispute has been brought before a court, it 
should be resolved by the court, and the parties therefore may not voluntarily 
remove the dispute from the court.  See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).  This argument is premised on a belief that “the purpose of 
adjudication is not the resolution of a dispute, not to produce peace, but rather 
justice . . . .”  Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1276–77 
(2009) (explaining Against Settlement).  Carrie Menkel-Meadow has characterized the 
debate over the primary purpose of adjudication as the question of who “owns” any 
particular dispute, the disputants themselves, or the community generally.  Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:  A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of 
Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2679–80 (1995).  Addressing this 
question in detail is beyond the scope of this Article.  Clearly, however, the idea that 
disputants have and may waive an individual right to have an Article III judge resolve 
their dispute takes as a fundamental premise that the disputants themselves “own” 
their dispute. 
 235. See supra Part I.B. 
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have waived their constitutional right to an Article III forum.236  While 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the standard for determining 
waiver of constitutional rights in the criminal context is a subjective 
one requiring knowing and voluntary waiver,237 it has not expressly 
extended that requirement to waivers of constitutional rights in the 
civil context. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the 
standards are the same.  For example, in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick 
Co.,238 Overmyer contracted with Frick to install a refrigeration system 
in one of Overmyer’s warehouses.239  Following various renegotiations 
of payment terms, Overmyer ultimately signed a note containing a 
confession of judgment clause allowing Frick to have a civil judgment 
entered against it without notice or hearing in the event the company 
defaulted on its payment obligations.240  This is sometimes called a 
cognovit clause.241  In upholding the validity of a judgment obtained 
pursuant to the cognovit clause, the Supreme Court held that 
Overmyer had “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” waived its 
constitutional due process rights when it agreed to the confession of 
judgment provision.242  While careful to note that it was only 
assuming, not deciding, that the same standards governing waivers of 
constitutional rights in the criminal context likewise applied in the 
civil context, the Court suggested that in a future case where a waiver 
was not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made, it might not be 
upheld.243  Indeed, in a companion case decided the same day as 
Overmyer, the Court affirmed a district court opinion refusing to 
enforce cognovit clauses in consumer financing agreements absent a 
                                                          
 236. The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed what level of consent is 
required to waive the individual constitutional right to an Article III forum.  In Schor, 
the Court noted that a party had effectively waived his right to have an Article III 
court adjudicate a counterclaim when he participated in a non-Article III agency 
proceeding “with full knowledge” that the agency would exercise jurisdiction over 
his counterclaim.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 850.  Whether “full knowledge” is a minimum 
requirement or whether some level of consent less than full knowledge would be 
sufficient to waive Article III rights, however, is not clear from the opinion. 
 237. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of 
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts 
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (noting that “[a] 
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right” and requiring an “intelligent and competent” waiver). 
 238. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). 
 239. Id. at 179. 
 240. Id. at 180–81. 
 241. Id. at 176. 
 242. Id. at 187. 
 243. Id. at 185, 187–88. 
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showing that debtors had “intentionally, understandingly, and 
voluntarily” waived their constitutional due process rights at the time 
they signed the agreements.244  Similarly, less than four months later, 
the Court in Fuentes v. Shevin245 found that consumers had not waived 
their constitutional right to pre-seizure process where they signed 
agreements allowing sellers to repossess merchandise in the event the 
consumers defaulted on payment.246  In that case, the Court noted 
that the facts were “a far cry from those of Overmyer,” pointing out 
that: 
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the 
parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power.  
The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales 
contract and a necessary condition of the sale.  The appellees made 
no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or 
made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as 
a waiver of constitutional rights.247 
While the Court in Fuentes ultimately did not rely on 
involuntariness or unintelligence of the waiver,248 and neither Fuentes 
nor Overmyer expressly transferred the subjective waiver standards 
from the criminal context to the civil context,249 circuit courts 
addressing the issue have generally adopted the strong implication of 
those cases that waiver of civil constitutional rights likewise requires 
knowing and voluntary consent.250 
                                                          
 244. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 196–200 (1972). 
 245. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 246. Id. at 95–96. 
 247. Id. at 95. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 94–95. 
 250. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 
205 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[C]onstitutional rights . . . may be contractually waived where 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver make it clear that the party 
foregoing its rights has done so of its own volition, with full understanding of the 
consequences of its waiver.” (quoting Erie Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 
1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988))), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3197 (U.S. Sept. 21, 
2012) (No. 12-373); Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 969 
(9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that a waiver of both civil and criminal 
constitutional rights must be knowing and voluntary); Echavarria v. Pitts, 641 F.3d 92, 
94 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting, in civil cases, that a “waiver of constitutional rights is 
not effective unless the right is intentionally and knowingly relinquished” (quoting 
Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 787 (5th Cir. 1989))); Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 
F.3d 495, 505 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that waiver of due process rights to 
a deportation hearing “must be done both knowingly and voluntarily”); Hollins v. 
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing as controlling 
the Supreme Court’s application of the identical civil and criminal waiver standard of 
“voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” made (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94–95)), 
abrogated on other grounds by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Burke 
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Although courts thus seem to endorse a subjective knowing and 
voluntary standard for determining waiver of constitutional rights—
even in the civil context—as discussed above, they apply only an 
objective, contract-level standard of consent to arbitration.251  
Recognizing that arbitration can be justified only as a waiver of 
Article III rights exposes the tension in this state of affairs.  This 
mismatch suggests that standards of consent to arbitration must be 
raised to the constitutional knowing and voluntary standard in order 
to align FAA jurisprudence with constitutional waiver 
jurisprudence.252  In addition, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized a presumption against the waiver of constitutional 
rights.253  Thus, given that arbitration under the FAA is a waiver of 
constitutional rights, determining whether parties have consented to 
arbitration must also be subject to a presumption against arbitration. 
While an interpretation of the Constitution requiring knowing and 
voluntary waiver of constitutional rights necessarily trumps any 
statutory interpretation of the FAA requiring only a contract-level 
standard of consent, it is nevertheless worth pointing out that 
knowing and voluntary consent to arbitration is not inconsistent with 
the text of the FAA.  Defenders of contract-level waiver standards 
point to the language of section 2 of the FAA, which states that an 
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”254  While section 2 requires that arbitration 
agreements be treated as enforceable as any other kind of 
                                                          
County, 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The contractual waiver of a 
constitutional right must be a knowing waiver [and] must be voluntarily given . . . .”); 
Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that Second Circuit 
precedent “suggests that the waiver of a fundamental right in the context of civil 
cases must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”).  While the Eighth 
Circuit does not appear to expressly endorse a knowing and voluntary standard, it 
reads Fuentes as requiring at least that contractual waivers of civil constitutional 
rights “be clear and unambiguous.”  In re Workers’ Comp. Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 
819 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 251. Supra Part I.B. 
 252. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. 
REV. 478, 545 (1981) (“[T]he contract standard cannot be used to justify those 
waivers that involve constitutional rights since such rights necessarily take 
precedence over the contract policy of honoring private agreements.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 682 (1999); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94 n.31; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. 
Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). 
 254. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 
1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, 
and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 170. 
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agreement,255 a necessary prerequisite to enforcing an arbitration 
agreement is the existence of such an agreement.  Yet enforceability 
and existence of an arbitration agreement are separate concepts,256 
and section 2 addresses only the former.  Determination of the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate is covered in section 4 of the 
FAA, which requires that before a court compels arbitration, it must 
be “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is 
not in issue.”257  Unlike the enforceability determination under 
section 2, however, the determination under section 4—whether an 
agreement actually has been made—does not reference contract law.  
Indeed, section 4 does not specify the standards by which a court is to 
satisfy itself that an agreement to arbitrate exists.  Thus, requiring 
knowing and voluntary consent to arbitration before compelling 
arbitration is not inconsistent with the text of the FAA.258 
In sum, this Article’s thesis—that arbitration under the FAA can 
only be justified as a waiver of Article III rights—suggests that 
consent to arbitration must be determined under the standards used 
to determine waiver of civil constitutional rights generally, namely a 
subjective knowing and voluntary standard with a presumption 
against waiver.  Before concluding, however, it is important to point 
out two caveats.  The first caveat is that this Article does not attempt 
to lay out in detail how a subjective consent standard with a 
presumption against arbitration would be applied in practice.  On 
the one hand, it seems likely that practices such as unilateral 
adoption of arbitration agreements by employers or consumer service 
providers259 would not pass muster under the standard suggested 
here.  On the other hand, agreements to arbitrate an existing dispute 
would seem to raise few, if any, questions of consent,260 and perhaps a 
                                                          
 255. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745–46 
(2011). 
 256. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006). 
 257. 9 U.S.C. § 4.  Section 3 similarly requires that before a court may stay 
litigation in favor of arbitration, it must be satisfied that an arbitration agreement 
exists covering the dispute.  Id. § 3. 
 258. Nor is section 2 rendered a nullity by requiring knowing and voluntary 
consent to arbitration.  Once a court determines that parties have knowingly and 
voluntarily consented to arbitration, there are still issues of validity, revocability, and 
enforceability not related to assent to which section 2 still applies (such as illegality 
or lack of consideration, for example). 
 259. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 260. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law 
(with a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 199 
(1998) (noting that parties signing post-dispute arbitration agreements are (1) aware 
that they are obligating themselves to arbitrate because dispute resolution is the only 
subject matter of such agreements, and (2) likely advised by lawyers). 
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signed post-dispute arbitration agreement would be enough to 
establish subjective consent to arbitration.  In between those poles lie 
cases involving issues such as the circumstances in which non-parties 
should be bound to arbitration agreements and application of the 
separability rule.261  Under the standard suggested here, disputants in 
such cases would be presumed not to have consented to arbitration, 
but the question of what kinds of evidence would be required to 
rebut that presumption and establish subjective consent is not 
answered here, and perhaps best left to case-by-case evolution of FAA 
jurisprudence. 
The second caveat to keep in mind is that despite the strong 
implications of Overmyer and Fuentes, the Supreme Court has not 
expressly held that the standard for waiving constitutional rights in 
the civil context is a subjective knowing and voluntary standard.  
Indeed, Stephen Ware has cautioned against overreliance on 
Overmyer and Fuentes and argued that the Supreme Court is in fact 
more likely, ultimately, to adopt a contract-law standard for waiver of 
constitutional rights in the civil context than a knowing and voluntary 
consent standard.262  Were the Court to do so, this Article’s 
conclusion that consent to arbitration must be measured under a 
subjective knowing and voluntary standard would change, but the 
fundamental thesis of the Article would not.  The fact that only waiver 
theory can justify arbitration under the FAA and that, consequently, 
consent to arbitration must be measured by the standards used to 
determine waiver of civil constitutional rights generally would not be 
affected.  To the extent the law on waiver of civil constitutional rights 
were to coalesce around a contract-law standard, only the 
implications on current FAA consent jurisprudence of this Article’s 
thesis—not the thesis itself—would change. 
CONCLUSION 
Article III of the Constitution allocates judicial power to life-
tenured, salary-protected judges.  Arbitrators adjudicating disputes 
that would otherwise be heard in federal court are exercising judicial 
power without such protections, which suggests that the FAA is 
inconsistent with a literal reading of Article III.  While Article III 
literalism has been rejected by both courts and scholars, the FAA 
does not fall comfortably within any of the judicial or scholarly 
                                                          
 261. See supra notes 76–91 and accompanying text. 
 262. Ware, supra note 254, at 182–88, 205. 
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approaches justifying resolution of Article III disputes by non-Article 
III tribunals.  Unless arbitration is determined to be an express 
exception to Article III’s mandate, which this Article has argued is 
not warranted, the FAA cannot be justified under the Supreme 
Court’s categorical exceptions approach to non-Article III 
adjudication.  Nor does the Court’s balancing test—to the extent it 
still remains viable post-Stern—justify allowing non-Article III 
arbitrators to resolve Article III disputes.  Finally, given the extremely 
limited judicial review of arbitration awards—and that any statutory 
change to the review standards is both unlikely and unwise—the FAA 
cannot be justified under appellate review theory, the leading 
scholarly approach to non-Article III adjudication generally. 
In light of the fact that the FAA is fundamentally inconsistent with 
Article III, waiver theory offers the only possible salvation for 
arbitration.  While waiver theory is not new, this article shores up its 
theoretical foundation by (1) firmly establishing that the FAA is 
indeed fundamentally inconsistent with Article III, thus filling a gap 
in current waiver theory, and (2) showing that private arbitration 
under the FAA does not implicate unwaivable structural separation of 
powers concerns.  In addition, this article points out that 
acknowledging that arbitration can only be justified as a waiver of 
Article III rights requires courts to determine whether parties have 
agreed to arbitration under the standards used to evaluate waiver of 
civil constitutional rights generally.  This represents a fundamental 
change to current FAA jurisprudence.  Specifically, while courts 
currently determine whether parties have consented to arbitration 
using contract-law objective standards of consent, given the 
constitutional mandate that judicial power over Article III disputes 
not be exercised by arbitrators lacking life tenure and salary 
protections, courts should instead apply a subjective knowing and 
voluntary standard. 
